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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
"Inflation is almost always a monetary phenomenon" 
M. Friedman 
The monetarist theory gives a clear definition of the actions and limitations of the 
monetary and fiscal authorities. According to that theory, the monetary authority should 
set the money growth rate with a clear objective of price level stability and it should be 
independent of the fiscal authority to achieve its goals. Whereas the fiscal authority will 
be responsible for its own house and should aim at keeping a balanced budget given the 
price level at all time. However. Sargent and Wallace (1981) and the advocates of the 
fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) indicated that this distinction between the 
monetary and fiscal authorities as two different parts of the government is not as strict as 
it seems and their relationship has important consequences on the price level. 
Almost two decades ago Sargent and Wallace (1981) showed that if monetary policy 
is defined as open market operations, then even in a monetarist environment the fiscal 
authority may act in a dominant fashion and exercise significant control over the inflation 
rate. That is, it is possible for the monetary authority to be a 'follower' and to lose control 
over the price level. 
Advocates of the fiscal theory of the price level, such as Woodford (1995), Leeper 
(1991), Sims (1993) and Cochrane (1998) take this argument one step further and argue 
that it is actually possible for both the monetary and the fiscal authorities to be dominant 
such that, fiscal and monetary authority are not bound by the solvency of its budget 
constraint. 
2 
The fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) arose as an attempt to explain the weak 
relation between monetary aggregates and the inflation rate in today's technologically 
advanced environment where, it is harder to control the monetary aggregates. 
The theoretical possibility of non -Ricardian policies is discussed by many 
economists and there are various studies on the relationship between the fiscal debt and 
the price level. However, there are very few empirical studies testing the FTPL. The 
studies by Canzoneri. Cumby and Diba ( 1998) and Cochrane (1998) have conflicting 
results. These studies aim at analysing the behaviour of the fiscal authority through the 
government budget constraint. However, due to the restrictions of the models the relation 
between the government debt, government surplus and the price level is missed. 
In this study we use structural vector autoregressive (VAR) and structural vector 
error correction (VECM) models to analyse the US price level in an IS -LM framework 
under the arguments of monetary theory, unpleasant monetarist arithmetic and the FTPL. 
The study is organized as follows. Chapter Two presents a discussion on the 
Ricardian and non -Ricardian policies in the context of the monetarist theory, the 
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic and the FTPL. The theoretical and empirical studies on 
the FTPL are also reviewed in that chapter. Chapter Three introduces the VAR and 
VECM econometric models that will be used for the empirical part of the study. Chapter 
Four states the identification restrictions we propose, to distinguish monetary theory, 
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic and FTPL for both the structural VAR and structural 
VECM models. The properties of our data set and the theoretical discussions on the 
econometric tools we use for cointegration analysis are given in Chapter Five. Our results 
are given in Chapter Six. Chapter Seven outlines the main findings of our study. 
3 
CHAPTER 2. MODELS OF PRICE LEVEL DETERMINATION 
This chapter derives a pure exchange economy with money in the utility function and 
studies price level determination under Ricardian and non -Ricardian monetary and fiscal 
policies for three different cases. 
The Model 
There are infinitely lived agents with an endowment of yt units of consumption good 
in each period. Government purchases gt, yield no utility to the consumers. In each period 
t the consumer chooses the level of consumption. ct, the nominal holdings of fiat 
currency. M,. and the nominal holdings of government bonds, Bt. Fiat currency does not 
earn interest. However, consumers earn a gross nominal rate of interest, Rt for their 
holdings of nominal government bonds. Real balances, mt, are defined as the ratio of 
nominal balances, M,. and the price level, pt. Similarly, the real value for government 
bonds. bt, is defined as the ratio of nominal bond holdings, Bt, and the price level, pt- At 
each period t, the consumer pays txt units of consumption good in lump sum taxes. 
Consumers have separable utility functions for money and consumer goods, and the 
utility is discounted at the constant rate of /?e (0,1 ). 
Given the initial wealth and the sequences of price, interest rate and net taxes, the 
representative consumer chooses the sequence of the end of period bond holdings {Bt}, 
the end of period money holdings, {Mt}, and the level of consumption {ct} to maximize 
his expected lifetime utility (1) with respect to the sequence of budget constraint (2), the 
transversality condition (3) and the nonnegativity constraints: 
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(1) 
PiCi +pttx, +B, +Mt < pty, + Rt-iBt-i +Mt-i t = 0,1,2 




Mi > 0, ct>0 
where the period t+1 nominal wealth. Wt+1, is defined by 
Wt+i =Mt+ R, B; 
Note that the utility function is twice differentiate, strictly increasing, strictly 
concave and Bt can be either positive or negative.1 
In the initial period 0. the government has initial outstanding liabilities M_i and 
B.|. Therefore the period 0 nominal wealth is: Wo= M.| + R_i B.| 
The first order conditions are: 
(4) 
-jj-U iXc,.m;) = pE, for t=0,l,2 
Note that under the assumption of separable utility and unitary consumption 
growth, ct=ct+i, this equality implies the Fisher Equation: R,=^E, £n1 
P, 
. =  - i .  for t = 0, 1. 2, 
p,ct +pttx, +B, +M, < p,yt + Ri_iBt.i +M,.| , for t = 0. 1, 2, 
M, B,  
where, m, = —- and b, = —. 
P, P, 
1 B,>0 implies that the government is borrowing from the household and B,<0 implies that the govemmet is 
loaning to the household. 
In the case of a log linear utility function: 
U f  M < = loge, + log f'V/,) Cr< 
I P, I Pi J 
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(7) 
Government expenditure is financed by direct lump sum taxes and by money and 
bond seignorage. Hence, the sequence of government budget constraints is defined as: 
p,gt-p,tx, = M, -M,.| +B, -R,.i B,.| for t = 0. 1, 2,... (8) 
There is no capital accumulation. In this pure exchange economy, the sequence of 
aggregate resource constraint is defined as, the total endowment in each period being 
consumed by the fiscal sector and the private agents: 
yt = ct +gt for t = 0, 1, 2,... (9) 
In equilibrium the resource constraint (9) and the budget constraints (7) and (8) have 
to be satisfied. Note that any two of these constraints imply the third constraint. 
Therefore, it is possible to work with any two of equations (7), (8) and (9). 
The optimisation problem includes the transversality condition." The sequence of 
single period budget constraint, the sequence of aggregate resource constraint and the 
transversality condition lead to the intertemporal budget constraint3 
— = (tx,+J -gl+j +fiuj mt+j ) (10) 
Pt  J=0\  s - t  )  
where. 
Qt+j = —— and rs = Rs. 
R
,-, 
The intertemporal budget condition ( 10) implies the equality between the real value 
of household sector wealth and the present value of the expected future government 
surpluses.4 The importance of this equation for equilibrium depends on the fiscal/ 
monetary policy. 
The equilibrium is defined as a sequence of {ct}, {Rt}, {pt}, {Mt}, {Bt}, {gt}, {tx,} 
and {W,+[} that are consistent with the monetary -fiscal policy and satisfy equations (5), 
' The transversality condition requires the household to fully utilize lifetime wealth. A violation of this 
condition implies that there is still room for a household to increase its lifetime utility. 
3 The intertemporal budget constraint is obtained from the single budget constraint by summing it up for 
each time period over the infinite horizon 
The same equation can be derived from the government budget constraint. Following Leeper (1991) the 
relation between equations (7), (8) and (9) allows us to represent equation (10) in terms of government debt 
and surplus. Using the transversality condition -which recognizes the fact that the fiscal authority can sell 
as much bond as he wants as long as the present value of debt is equal to zero- and equation (8) the 
government intertemporal budget constraint is defined as: 
B, '  t*  y-I \ -M 
~ - £  n - ; 1  — — — — )  c o ' )  
Pi  j=0 \  I= t  y  Pr+ / t l  
The real value of government debt is equal to the present discounted value of future government revenue 
-which is the tax revenues net of expenditures and seignorage -
Defining S, as the present value of government surplus from money seignorage and tax revenue net of 
expenditures, equation (10*) can be written as: 
B, 
— = S, (10") 
P,  
7 
(6), (8), (9), (10) together with the initial conditions and the exogenous output sequence 
{y,}5. 
The fiscal -monetary policy is defined as sequences {g,}, {R,}, {Bt}, {Mt} and {txt} 
such that the government flow budget constraint (equation (8)) is satisfied in every 
period. The policy can be Ricardian or non -Ricardian according to the relation between 
the real value of the government debt and the price level.6 The policy is defined as 
Ricardian, if it ensures that the government budget constraint is satisfied for all price 
sequences. In case of a Ricardian policy the monetary and fiscal policy variables are 
determined endogenous^ by prices guaranteeing the solvency of the intertemporal 
government budget constraint. Therefore, the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied 
for all price levels. However, for non -Ricardian policy the intertemporal budget 
constraint is an equilibrium condition, not satisfied for every price sequence. For non -
Ricardian policies the policy authority is not constrained by the solvency of the 
intertemporal government budget constraint. Solvency will, however, emerge as part of 
the economy's equilibrium solution. 
g 
Defining the intertemporal government budget constraint as — = S„ it is seen that a 
P, 
non-Ricardian fiscal policy argues that the out of equilibrium real values of the surplus 
are not equal to the real values of debt.7 This does not mean that the government does not 
care about the budget constraint. It is simply that for non-Ricardian polices the level of 
surplus is set before the price level is determined. Any threat to the solvency of the 
budget constraint is confronted by the market mechanism moving the price level. 
5 Under perfect foresight equilibrium, which we will assume for the empirical tests, the equilibrium 
sequences are such that the money and bond supplied by the government equal to the money and bond 
demanded by the household. 
6 Woodford ( 1994) 
7 A Ricardian fiscal policy argue that the fiscal policy sets the sequence of {B,} or {tx,} such that the real 
value of surplus defined as money seignorage and primary surplus is equal to B Zp for all price levels. 
8 
"Under a non -Ricardian rule, the government moves before the "Walrasian 
auctioneer" does, so that the auctioneer is forced to call prices that are consistent with the 
real surpluses announced by the government." (Bassetto, 2001) 
Under a Ricardian rule, it is important to indicate whether the monetary or fiscal 
authority is dominant, in the sense that the authority sets its policy variables exogenously. 
Leeper (1991) defines a policy as active if the authority sets its policy variable without 
constraining itself by the actions of the other authority. Similarly, a policy is referred to as 
passive if the policy authority is required to set its policy variable in response to the 
actions of the other authority to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraints in the 
system.8 
"Because an active authority is not constrained by current budgetary conditions, it is 
free to chose a decision rule that depends on past, current, or expected future variables. A 
passive authority is constrained by consumer optimisation and the active authority's 
actions, so it must generate sufficient tax revenues to balance the budget." 
(Leeper, 1991) 
Monetarist Theory 
The monetarist theory of price level determination is based on the argument that the 
monetary authority has total control over prices. Under a Ricardian monetary -fiscal 
policy, where the monetary authority is dominant, the fiscal authority determines the 
sequences of (gt), {tx,} and {Bt} such that the government budget constraint is satisfied 
at all price levels. Therefore, with a monetary policy controlling the sequences of money 
8 When a monetary/fiscal authority follows an active policy it is regarded that the monetary/fiscal authority 
is dominant. 
supply {Mt}, the price level path is determined from the money market equilibrium 
condition, independent of the fiscal policy variables. 
The monetarist theory on price level determination is defined by active monetary and 
passive fiscal policy operating within a Ricardian framework. Thus, following the basic 
model developed previously, under a constant level of consumption, equations (5) and (6) 
and the monetary policy setting the money supply determines the price level sequence 
independent of the fiscal policy variables: 
P, = 
(  Ol ,  \  
-ipf-l (11) 
VM,_| -CpMy 
As is seen from equation (11) additional constraints are needed to uniquely determine 
the price level. 
Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic 
Sargent & Wallace (1981) showed that it is possible for the fiscal authority to affect 
the level of prices even with Ricardian policies. The "Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic" 
of Sargent and Wallace (1981) is a result of a Ricardian policy with active fiscal and 
passive monetary policies. They argue that if the fiscal authority acts in a dominant 
fashion and, for example, sets a constant level of government expenditures net of taxes (g 
-tx) and keeps the real value of government bonds (B/p) at a predetermined level, a 
Ricardian environment requires the monetary authority to be a follower.9 That is, the 
monetary policy responds to a dominant fiscal policy by setting a growth rate of money to 
9 A policy authority following an active policy is regarded as dominant and the policy authority forced to 
follow a passive policy is regarded as a follower. 
10 
10 generate the money seignorage necessary to satisfy the government budget constraint. 
Hence, contrary to the standard monetarist argument, an " expansionary fiscal policy 
is inflationary" (Sargent and Wallace, 1981). Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999) define this 
model of fiscal dominancy as a weak form of the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) 
due to the fact that although the price level is still driven by the monetary authority, the 
growth rate of money is now a function of the fiscal policy variables, g, tx and B." 
In their paper, Sargent and Wallace define the monetary policy as money supply 
targeting rules. However, for our purposes it will be more convenient to define it as an 
interest rate targeting policy that is formulated to satisfy the government budget 
constraint. Hence, the interest rate rule for the monetary authority is defined by the 
government budget constraint given the household demand conditions and the fiscal 
policy. 
Recall that for a constant level of primary surpluses, D = (g -txt) and a constant real 
government debt b, the government flow budget constraint is:'' 
(81 D = m, -trit-i 
c \  
P,-i + b — R[.| 
/ \ 
P,-i 
I P< J I P. ) 
Given fiscal policy variables and the demand conditions, (5) and (6), equation (8) 
solves for the path of the interest rate as a function of the fiscal policy variables:13 
/L.-l R,=l+-
(*,-,-1) '  D b
f  
c c  
X 
-1 
J  J  
1 
(12) 
10 Sargent and Wallace define monetary policy as money growth rate policies, M, = 0M,.|.The analysis is 
based on constant government expenditures, constant rate of interest being greater than the growth rate of 
population and constant nominal bonds, which is determined historically. 
1 Dominant fiscal policies argue for central bank independence since in that model "The central bank is 
driven by the fiscal authority" (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1999) 
Under the aggregate resource constraint: y,= c,+ g, the household and government budget constraints are 
the same. 
13 A detailed analysis is given in appendix A 
Il 
However, stability analysis and the comparative statics show that the fiscal policy 
does not affect the (stable) steady state equilibrium interest rate. 
Note that the rate of inflation, n,  = is now a function of the fiscal policy 
Pt-X 




*,=/?+ f r \ ^ \ - (l3) 
c 
1 - - I - 1  
1 
"One of the most important implications of this theory is the possibility that tight 
money today could increase today's price level! That is. a low money supply today 
necessitates increased inflation tomorrow, implying - if money demand is sufficiently 
elastic - a high price level today Low money today directly lowers current prices. 
But there is an additional, indirect effect - the higher future inflation necessary for budget 
balance increases the nominal interest rate, lowering real money demand today. The latter 
effect drives up today's prices and overwhelms the former if money demand is 
sufficiently interest elastic." (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1999)14 
Fiscal Theory of Price Level 
Ricardian policies do not permit a dual dominancy of monetary and fiscal authorities. 
However, the fiscal theory of price level argues that in a non -Ricardian policy 
environment it is possible for both the fiscal and the monetary authorities to follow an 
active policy. 
14 For that to hold the household money demand must be a function of future price levels as well as today's 
level of prices. 
12 
The fiscal theory of price level is a rather new approach to monetary economics 
developed by Woodford ( 1995), Leeper (1991) and Sims (1993) to answer the following 
questions: 
• How is the price level determined in the case of endogenous money, which occurs 
with free banking and interest rate pegging? 
• Is it true that monetization is not a significant financial tool for governments who 
depend less on money seignorage? 
The weak relation between monetary aggregates and the inflation rate in the U.S. and 
the fact that the U.S. inflation rate is stable even though the U.S. follows an endogenous 
money policy are the two facts that Woodford (1995) tries to explain.15 The model is 
formed to capture the impact of fiscal policy on the price level, which is believed to be 
the missing point of the conventional monetarist view. Woodford does not argue that the 
equilibrium conditions of the quantity theory of price level are irrelevant, but rather 
incomplete.16 Contrary to the monetarist view that inflation is being driven only by 
monetary aggregates, he argues that the price level is determined from the government 
budget constraint as the ratio of the nominal value of debt to the present value of expected 
future surpluses. 
Woodford argues that the LM equation defines the equilibrium interest rate 
differential (in case money is exogenous) or the money supply (in case money is 
endogenous) rather than the equilibrium price level as monetarist theory suggests.17 
15 Cochrane (1998) presents the US the growth rate of base money, M1 and M2 together with the consumer 
price index. He argues, that the"... variation in inflation has essentially nothing to do with the history of 
monetary aggregates. The swings of inflation in the 1970 s and especially the dramatic end of inflation in 
the 1980's occurred without any obvious corresponding changes in monetary growth." 
16 Under the quantity theory of money there are an infinite number of price path solving for the equilibrium 
conditions. 
17 
"With an interest elastic demand and fixed supply, money demand can still determine the expected rate of 
inflation or expected price level, but it does not determine the (ex-post) price level. The government budget 
constraint then determines the price level" Cochrane (1998) 
13 
Hence, with monetary policy following a pegged interest rate policy and fiscal policy 
being non-Ricardian, the price level will be determined by the present value of 
government liabilities.18 This condition implies that "the current money supply and its 
expected future path are irrelevant for the determination of the equilibrium price level." 
Woodford (1995) A monetary shock will effect the price level eventually " only as a 
result of the eventual effects of monetary policy upon the size of the total government 
liabilities, which then affects the price level through the fiscal policy rule. And even in 
this case, it is arguable that such effects upon the price level as occur are due to fiscal 
effects of policy change, rather than upon the mere fact that households are forced to hold 
a different quantity of money; for the price level grows in proportion to the growth of 
total government liabilities, and not in proportion to growth of the monetary component 
of those liabilities." (Woodford. 1995) 
Given the private sector's problem, the monetary policy as an interest rate peg, and 
fiscal policy as an exogenous budget debt/surplus value, equation (5) drives the interest 
rate rule: 
R, = (51 
P P, 
And, the money supply is driven by equation (61: 
(61 AfL 
P, 
f \  
Pi+x 
.P,«-PP,) 
Hence, the intertemporal government budget constraint together with the demand 
conditions and the monetary policy solves for the price level:19 
18 Woodford, notes lhat the impact of fiscal policy on the equilibrium value of money is consistent with the 
findings of Sargent since the value of money, which is a part of government debt, depends upon the 
expectations of the households on the debt flow to back it. 
19 A detailed analysis is given in appendix A 
14 
Pt = Pt-1 
^^(c-D)-b 
j = o 
v ;=° 
(14) 
Contrary to the monetarist view that inflation is being driven only by monetary 
aggregates, in a non -Ricardian environment with active fiscal and monetary policies, the 
price level is only a function of fiscal policy variables. It is determined from the 
government budget constraint as the ratio of the nominal value of debt to the present 
value of expected future surpluses-0 
Ricardian policies assume that the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem holds. That is, the 
fiscal policy does not create any wealth effects.23 However, this is not the case for non -
Ricardian policies. In the case of active monetary and fiscal policies, the fiscal policy 
does create a wealth effect since an increase in the value of government bonds affects the 
households' lifetime budget set. 
"The way the fiscal disturbances affect the price level is through a wealth effect upon 
private consumption demand. A tax cut not balanced by any expectation of future tax 
increases would make households perceive themselves to be able to afford more lifetime 
consumption, if neither prices nor interest rates were to change from what would have 
been their equilibrium values in the absence of the tax cut. This would lead them to 
demand more goods than they choose to supply (both immediately and in the future). The 
resulting imbalance between the demand and supply of goods drives up the price of goods 
20 The price level is determined from the intertemporal government budget constraint (equation ( 10)): 
P,=W, 
— Z f+M > 
Z IV VJ=0\ J=r / 
21 Recall that the monetarist theory solved for a path of the price level. Additional constraints have to be 
imposed on the model for equation (13) to solve for today's price level. However, the FTPL solves for 
today's price level without imposing additional restrictions on the path of prices. 
The comparative statistics shows that a positive fiscal shock has a positive impact on the price level 
23 
'Government bonds are not net wealth" (Barro, 1984). 
15 
until the resulting reduction in the real value of households' financial assets causes them 
to curtail demand (or increase supply) to the point at which equilibrium is restored." 
(Woodford, 1998) 
In his studies Woodford takes these strong arguments on the impact of fiscal policy, 
one step further and argues that the fiscal theory of price level works under any type of 
monetary regime unless there is a Ricardian fiscal policy, which is a "special' case. 
Theoretical Studies on Fiscal Theory of Price Level 
One significant force behind the FTPL is the ability and will of the fiscal authorities 
to use money financing. Hence, it is reasonable to ask if governments with less 
dependence on money financing could still choose to impose a higher price level. The 
studies of Leeper (1991) and Bergin (2000) have important results on that issue. 
Leeper (1991) argues that the average level of money seignorage is not a factor on 
deciding the financing method of the debt. Hence, it may be misleading to argue that 
economies with a low dependence of money seignorage do not choose money financing. 
He specifies cases where money financing is an option for governments even when all 
their debt is backed by taxes. For this study he uses an FTPL framework with monetary 
and fiscal policy, given as: 
• Monetary authority sets the interest rate, Rt as a function of inflation rate: 
Rt =ao +a ft, + et 
• Real tax revenue, tax, as a function of government debt, bt.i 
taxt = ao + ab,.i +q, 
where, e, and q, are AR(1) processes. 
16 
These policy functions along with the solution to the private sector's optimization 
problem define a  system of  inflat ion,  Ji t  and real  debt ,  b t  :  
E, ^, = ap£r+p6, 
(p xn t+b,+ (p,  -yJ^-.+^et+Vt+^Et-i =0 
where, and b,  are fluctuations from the corresponding steady state values and. 
<Pi = 
R-1 







<P3 =" (tf-ir 
9-> <P4 =—=" 
a 
c, R, n and b are the steady state values of consumption, nominal interest rate, 
nominal rate of inflation and the real debt. 
This system can be used to discuss different scenarios of price level determination, 
one of which shows that, with active fiscal and passive monetary policy -i.e., under a 
pegged interest rate and constant tax revenue- the price level is determined by the 
government budget constraint."4 "Under pegged nominal interest rates and active fiscal 
behaviour, monetary policy's effect on prices depends on how the fiscal authority adjusts 
direct taxes in response to real debt movements. When taxes are unresponsive to debt, 
unanticipated monetary contractions immediately raise nominal interest rates and real 
debt and lower real balances. Prices respond with a lag. If future direct taxes rise (fall) 
with increases in real debt, the contraction lowers (raises) current inflation." (Leeper, 
1991) 
24 
"..an active authority is not constrained by current budgetary conditions, it is free to choose a decision 
rule that depends on past, current or expected future variables. A passive authority is constrained by 
consumer optimisation and active authority's actions, so it must generate sufficient tax revenues to balance 
the budget" Leeper ( 1991) 
17 
Bergin (2000) follows the same approach to address the importance of money 
financing in the case of a monetary union. He formulates a two-country model with a 
common central bank. In this model, the central bank controls the money supply through 
open market operations. The national governments receive transfers from the central bank 
and adjust lump-sum taxes to finance their deficits.25 The rational expectations 
equilibrium conditions of the model lead to important arguments for a monetary union. 
First of all, under certain risk sharing assumptions, it is not required for all the member 
countries to have fiscal solvency for price stability. It is argued that under perfect 
insurance the debt of a country is absorbed by the surplus of another country. It is 
important to point out the fact that this proposition leads to important wealth effects. 
Bergin also argues that one bad apple could spoil the whole bundle. Even if the common 
central bank refuses to issue new money, the governments with large debt would still 
follow irresponsible polices and campaign for higher price levels. This is a problem for 
other countries too since an increase in the unbacked debt of a government not only 
increases the price level in that country but it increases price levels all through the 
monetary union. 
In contrast to these arguments, the study by Dupor (2000) on open market models 
indicates that the FTPL is not sufficient to pin down the equilibrium price level. He 
studies the determination of the exchange rate in a two-country set up with dominant 
fiscal policy and nominal interest rate pegging. His model allows for households to 
exchange goods, money and government bonds under a no -arbitrage condition in the 
bonds market. His solutions for the cases of substitutable and non-substitutable currencies 
indicate that, " the nominal exchange rate is indeterminate if both governments peg the 
25 It is assumed that the transfers to the national governments are symmetric 
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interest rate on domestic bonds." (Dupor, 2000) This conclusion for the indeterminacy of 
the price levels of each country and the exchange rate is in contrast to the arguments of 
the FTPL. 
To see if the FTPL is an acceptable model, Carlstrom and Fuerst ( 1999) analyzes the 
reliability of the assumptions of two different versions of the FTPL, which they name 
'strong form' and weak form' FTPL. Both forms of the FTPL assume a dominant fiscal 
policy for price level determination. However, they differ in the way the monetary policy 
is applied. "Weak form FT posits that inflation is indeed a monetary phenomenon, but 
that money growth is dictated by the fiscal authority. Strong form FT, on the other hand, 
argues that even if money growth is unchanged, fiscal policy independently affects the 
price level and the inflation rate." (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1999). Working with separable 
preferences and an interest rate pegging policy, the partial and general equilibrium 
analyses of the weak and strong form FT indicate that, strong form FT requires 
unrealistically large interest elasticity of money demand and output elasticity of money 
demand for fiscal policy to be able to determine the price path. 
The dependability of the FTPL for real world analyses is also questioned in the study 
of Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999). They argue that that it is more reasonable to believe 
in the monetarist theory of price determination since it is not 'logical' for governments to 
choose an inflationary outcome.26 
McCallum (2001) is against FTPL due to the definition of the fiscal policy that is 
used.27 He argues that the fiscal policy variable is actually the bond supply to the public, 
not the primary deficit or surplus. He shows that there is a monetarist type solution for the 
Their arguments on FTPL are based on certain examples for monetary and fiscal policy. 
27 His results are independent of the elasticity of money demand and any specific form of price path that has 
been required in previous studies. 
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price level in an FTPL framework, where the bond supply is taken as the fiscal policy 
variable. 
Gushing (1999) is another attack on the FTPL. He modifies the original model used 
by the advocates of FTPL and assumes that the households face a certain probability of 
death."8 Households do not leave bequests but they receive payments from insurance 
companies. The insurance companies finance these premium payments by collecting the 
financial assets of the deceased. The equilibrium conditions of this model create a system 
of money supply, bond supply and the price level, which is a function of the interest rate, 
government spending, probability of death, money supply and bond supply. Gushing 
solved the model for the cases of Ricardian and non -Ricardian consumers and concluded 
that the price level is indeterminate.29 
In their study on the FTPL, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000) are rather careful on the 
conditions where this theory might work. They model a cash-in-advance economy, to 
study the dependability of the balanced budget requirement as an anchor for price 
stability. Under the assumption that the government is not allowed to finance the deficit 
with money seignorage, the price level is determinate in case the primary rather than the 
secondary budget surplus/deficit is taken to be exogenous. 
To conclude, the FTPL is a controversial theory. 
28 The probability of death is used to differentiate between Ricardian and non-Ricardian policies as well as 
to create a divergence between the asset holdings of agents. For the Ricardian consumer the probability of 
death is zero 
He argues that the FTPL is based on the two unrealistic assumptions; i) the government debt converges 
and ii) the future inflation is constant. 
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Empirical Studies on Fiscal Theory of Price Level 
These theoretical models of the price level determination were tested by many 
empirical studies. Some of these studies followed a time series approach and others 
followed a structural approach. 
Structural studies use the government budget constraint to model the inflation rate as 
a function of government debt. Metin (1998), Ruge-Marcia (1999) and Cardosa (1992) 
are some recent examples of this type of empirical study. 
Metin (1998) estimated the following equation for the inflation rate in Turkey as a 
function of the Turkish budget deficit and output growth:30 31 
Ap= a+ 8B - Ay 
G-T 
where. Ay is the output growth rate. B is the scaled budget deficit; B = - -, where G is 
public sector expenditures, T is revenues, and H is base money. 
The regression results and tests for cointegration indicated that government deficits 
have a significant positive impact on the inflation rate.32 
30 The price level equation is a result of the modification of the government budget constraint; 
G-T AH 
PY ~ PY ( M I >  
where, A is the difference operator.G is public sector expenditures, T is revenues, H is base money, P is 
prices and Y is real income. 
In steady stale, 
A// ~~pY~^ (Ap + Ay) (M2) 
where, p and y are log(P) and log(Y) respectively. 
AH 
Solving equation (M2) for and using it in equation (Ml) gives the budget constraint; 
= A//'+//'(Ap + Ay) (M3) 
Then, equation (M3) is solved for price level. 
31 Annual data over the sample period 1950-1987. 
32 
" an increase in the scaled budget deficit immediately increases inflation." Metin (1998) 
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Ruge-Murcia (1999) used annual data for Brazil over the sample period 1940 -1988, 
finding that the level of expenditure is an important factor for the level and volatility of 
the inflation rate.33 34 
Although these studies are for countries with huge government debt, there are 
studies for the U.S. indicating that non monetary factors have a significant impact on the 
price level. 
Ahking and Miller ( 1985) used a multi- equation time series approach to study the 
relation between inflation and the public debt. In this study, they followed a three-stage 
procedure where base money growth, government deficits and inflation were treated as 
endogenous variables. The three-stage OLS analyses for the U.S. economy showed that 
government deficits have an important effect on the inflation rate.35 36 
Dhakal, Kandil, Sharma and Trescott (1984) focused on demand-pull/ cost-push 
theories for the causes of inflation.37 First, they estimated a vector autoregression (VAR) 
model of the money stock Ml, producer price index, interest rate and the gross national 
product to test the validity of the monetarist approach to explaining the inflation rate. 
Second, they created three new models by adding the government debt, wage rate and 
energy prices sequentially to the original model to search for the non-monetarist 
In that study Ruge- Marcia developed a dynamic model for inflation in case of monetization of the 
government debt, which is defined as the difference between government expenditures and the tax revenue. 
Tax revenue is modelled as a backward looking process such that it is influenced by the past inflation rates. 
He assumed a Cagan model for money demand and that the money supply is an endogenous process 
indexed to the government debt. The government debt is endogenous and assumed to be partially financed 
by an increase in money supply. The government expenditure is regarded as the fiscal policy variable and is 
assumed to follow a stationary second order autoregression process. Following a rational expectations 
approach the model is solved for the inflation rate, which is a function of past inflation rates and the 
discounted values of current and expected future government expenditures. 
34 It is assumed that the money supply and budget deficit are endogenous but government expenditure is an 
exogenous variable. 
35 Annual data over the sample period of 1950-1980 
36 
"...the deficits cause inflation in the 1950 s and the 1970 s but not in the 1960 s. The quantitative effect 
of deficits on inflation is small in the 1970's but not in the 1950 s" (Ahking and Miller, 1985) 
37 Quarterly data over the period of 1957-1991 
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determinants of inflation.38 For each of these four models they used the results of Granger 
causality tests and the specific gravity criterion of Caines, Keng and Sethi (1987) to solve 
the identification problem. However, the results could not resolve the conflict between the 
monetarist view and recent developments on inflation rate determination. The monetarist 
model indicates that the money supply has a strong effect on the price level. However, the 
VAR results also indicate that government debt, the wage rate and energy prices Granger 
cause the inflation rate. The VAR analysis indicates that the public debt has a significant 
effect on the inflation rate through aggregate demand, even when monetization was not an 
issue. 
The study by Cardoso (1992) on the economies of Brazil and Mexico indicates that 
fiscal policy is important for the stability of inflation in open economies. The empirical 
analysis of an open economy model showed that fiscal consolidation is very important for 
the success of disinflationary programs for economies with large fiscal debt.39 Moreover, 
it indicated that the existence of a huge external debt is a leading factor of the inflationary 
impact of government debt. 
The importance of the definition of the government debt for the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy is the central point in the study of Abizadeh and Yousefi (1998). They 
argued that the inconclusive results of empirical studies on the impact of the budget 
deficit on the inflation rate is due to the limited definition of public debt for closed 
38 An increase in energy prices and wage rate are the cost-push factors of inflation. Such a policy increases 
the cost of production, leading to a lower level of output. The consequent decline in output will result with 
an increase in the price level. However, any change in the budget deficit is a demand-pull factor of 
inflation. An increase in budget deficit implies higher government spending and lower taxes creating a 
positive impact on demand. 
The definitions for inflation rate, interest rate, balance of payments and the domestic credit creation 
together with the assumption that the public debt is financed by domestic credit (without bond financing) 
and external borrowing (no private external borrowing), the inflation rate is defined as a function of money 
supply, the share of the primary budget deficit in output and the share of net exports in output. 
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economy models.40 They analysed an open economy IS -LM model by VAR. The need to 
solve for multicollinearity between monetary and non monetary variables of inflation, led 
to a linear model of the domestic inflation rate (Pt) as a function of lagged real gross 
domestic product (Yt.i), the real deficit (DFt), the foreign rate of inflation (qt) and the 
domestic money supply (Ml,):4' 
P[ = f[Y,.l,DF„q„Mlt] 
The OLS and ML estimation results showed that "...budget deficits have no significant 
bearing on the rate of inflation".42 
The study by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (1998) also supports the monetarist view 
of the US inflation rate. They focus on the two opposite approaches to price level 
determination, -money or fiscal dominant regimes.43 The basic assumptions of these 
regimes are important for the effect of monetary / fiscal policies on the price level.44 
Hence, in order to choose the monetary policy for price stability it is necessary to decide 
on the right nominal anchor for the economy: fiscal dominance (FD) or monetary 
dominance (MD). VAR methods are used to distinguish between MD and FD regimes, 
and to see which regime the country has been following. They argue that the basic 
difference between the monetarist view and the FTPL lies in the way they look at the 
government budget constraint. In their closed economy model, the primary deficit is 
financed by bond or money seignorage. After scaling the variables of the customary 
government budget constraint by GDP, the model can be represented as: 
"in open economy models, the government spending is financed by the tax revenue, the money and bond 
seignorage and the net transfer payments to other governments. 
4lThe principal components method used to solve the problem of multicollinearity 
42 Annual data for U.S. over the sample period 1951-1986 
43 Fiscal dominant regime is defined as the one in which the price level is determined independently of the 
monetary aggregates, by the solvency of the government budget constraint. In contrast, in the money 
dominant regime the price level is determined by the supply and demand of money. 
44 Applying a money supply rule would cause an over determined price level in case of FD regime. 
However, an interest rate targeting rule results with an undetermined price level in case of an MD regime 
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Wj =Sj +Ctj wj+1 
where, the ratio of liabilities to GDP, wJ? is equal to ratio of the surplus to the GDP, sj, 
plus the discounted value, ctj, of the ratio of next period's liabilities. Under MD and FD 
there is a positive correlation between Sj and wj. However, the relation between Sj and wJ+i 
distinguishes between FD and MD. Under the assumption that the debt is following a 
backward looking process, monetarist theory predicts a fall in wJ+l in case of an increase 
in surplus. In contrast, in the fiscal regime a positive innovation in Sj can have a zero, 
positive or negative effect on wJ+i, depending upon whether Sj has a zero positive or 
negative correlation with future surpluses and discount factors. For the empirical tests, the 
authors look at the impulse responses and the forecast variances for the effect of the ratio 
of current surplus/GDP on the ratio of next period liabilities/GDP. The results indicate 
that the surplus is not exogenous but is affected by the current level of liabilities and 
although the current surplus/GDP ratio is not negatively correlated with future surpluses, 
the liabilities/GDP has negative reaction to a positive shock in surplus/GDP. Hence, it is 
concluded that, "the post war US data strongly favours the MD regime over the FD 
regime".45 
Cochrane (1998b) criticizes this conclusion and argues that the negative effect of 
higher surpluses on the real debt is not a monetary outcome but the result of a conscious 
decision by the fiscal authority to decrease the volatility of the inflation rate. 
Cochrane (1998b) argues that the composition of the government debt is crucial for 
the effect of surpluses on the price level. Therefore, he extends the one period debt 
version of the fiscal theory of price level to include long-term debt. Hence, the 
government debt is a function of nominal bond prices and so it is also a function of 
45 The VAR result indicated that the surplus is not exogenous but affected by the current level of the 
liabilities and although the current surplus/GDP ratio is not negatively correlated with future surpluses, the 
liabilities/GDP has negative reaction to a positive shock in surplus/GDP. 
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expected future price levels. His analysis shows that the fiscal authority is able to 
postpone inflation by choosing an appropriate debt structure. A fiscal authority following 
an optimal passive policy can smooth inflation with a long maturity debt structure rather 
than with a short maturity structure if the present value of the surplus is more volatile than 
the level of surplus.46 Similarly, the fiscal authority following an optimal active policy 
will have the ability to exchange future inflation with a decrease in today's price level by 
devaluing long-term bonds unexpectedly.47 
Cochrane argues that the fiscal authority follows an optimal policy to smooth the 
inflation rate. The fiscal authority has control over the maturity structure and the level of 
debt and has partial control over the surplus. The surplus structure, st is defined as the 
sum of the cyclical portion c, -which the fiscal authority cannot control- and the 
controllable component, z,. If z, is a random walk process, z, = zw+e,, then the 
government can choose et at each time. Hence, given the equation for the price level,48 
( 1 —L)pt= — [( 1 —P)( 1 —pop) /(I — Pp)( 1 —PO)] ( 1 —L) Ct -Ct +( 1 —L)(L —4>P)Bt (*) 
the optimal fiscal policy is the one where the government chooses the maturity structure 
<D, the level of nominal debt sequence {Bt} and the sequence {et} to minimize the 
inflation rate. 
"Cochrane describes the optimal passive policy as the one in which "...the government determines only the 
steady state level of debt and its maturity structure, and the government does not adjust debt in response to 
surplus shocks" 
^Cochrane describes the optimal active policy as the one in which the government "... changes the amount 
and maturity structure in response to surplus shocks" 
48 Cochrane argues that the sequence of prices are a solution to the present value identity (except the case of 
no new debt) for a given sequences of debt and surplus. The present value identity is the equality of the real 
value of outstanding debt to the present value of net surpluses: 
Bv, /p, + E, (l/p„j) B,.,(t+j) =E, /?y s„, 
]=\ j=0 
Iterating this identity forward with geometric weights together with the equation of surplus leads to the 
price equation (*) 
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A comparison of the artificial time series generated by this optimal fiscal policy with 
the actual U.S. data shows some similarities. However, it is not a perfect match. Cochrane 
argues that the reason is that the optimal fiscal model is too successful in reducing the 
variation of the inflation rate. 
Cochrane (1998a) studies the history of the U.S. inflation rate from an FTPL view, 
using a structural VAR model of prices, debt and the surplus which is modelled as a sum 
of a long run component (zt) and a cyclical component (ct). 
The results of this analysis for the inflation rate are the same as those in the previous 
paper by Cochrane. The model fits nicely to the US data. Based on this finding Cochrane 
argues that, the government adjusts its budget to smooth the rate of inflation in case of a 
cyclical surplus shock. The government "...sells extra debt in recessions, raising revenue 
by so doing because it implicitly promises to raise subsequent surpluses" (Cochrane, 
1998) 
The basic difference between the monetary theory and the FTPL is the way that fiscal 
policy is modelled. Hence, distinguishing between the Ricardian and non -Ricardian 
policy is the first step to model a policy to stabilize the rate of inflation. Christiano and 
Fitzgerald (2000) propose two ways to choose between Ricardian and non -Ricardian 
policies: 
"One is to try to extrapolate what is reasonable out of equilibrium behavior based on 
what we see in equilibrium. Another way is to view the FTPL as a starting point for 
natural set of auxiliary assumptions which do restrict time series data, and then test those 
assumptions." (Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2000) 
The structural VAR models of Cochrane (1998) and Canzoneri, Cumba and Diba 
(1998) relied on this second approach to analyse the history of inflation. Their models 
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based on the arguments of FTPL, focused only on the relation between the public surplus 
and debt.49 
49 The model Cochrane developed "captures only the part of inflation that are correlated with surplus and 
value" Cochrane (1998a) 
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CHAPTER 3. MULTI -EQUATION MODELS 
Vector Autoregression Models 
The main advantage of VAR analysis is that it can treat all variables symmetrically. 
All variables are treated as endogenous with the time path of each variable determined by 
the current and past values of themselves and the other variables. A general dynamic 
structural system can be written as a pth order vectorautoregression process; 
D (L) Xt =e, (16) 
where, Xt is an n dimensional stationary vector stochastic process, D (L) is a p,h degree 
matrix polynomial in the lag operator L; Do -D|L -D: L" - -Dp Lp, with the Dj s being 
nxn matrices. Do is an nxn matrix of parameters on the contemporaneous endogenous 
variables and e, is an nxl vector white noise process whose elements are 
contemporaneously uncorrected structural disturbances. 
Equation (16) is a structural/primitive vector autoregressive representation of the 
time series. Solving for X, gives the vector autoregressive model in its standard reduced 
form: 
A(L)X, = e, (17) 
where, A(L) = I„-A,L -A2L2 -....-ApLp = In -Do (D,L +....+ DpLp) ande,= Do"1 e,. 
Note that the elements of et are serially uncorrected error terms with zero mean and 
constant variance, but will typically be contemporaneously correlated since they are linear 
combinations of the structural disturbances, eu, enl. 
The variance covariance matrix for the error terms of equation ( 17) is given as: 
Ie=E (ete/ ) 
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Since the error terms in (17) are related to the structural shocks in (16) according to 
Ct =Dq £t, 
2e=E (Do"1 £, e\ Do"1)  
and so, 
Se=D0"' SE Do ' 
where, Ze is the diagonal variance covariance matrix of the structural disturbances. 
Economic theory can be used to specify Xt and the appropriate lag length tests can be 
used to determine p, the order of the VAR.50 
Due to the correlation between elements of X, and £,, the structural VAR is not used 
for estimation purposes. This is not the case for the VAR in standard form. The ordinary 
least squares estimator of each equation in (17) will give consistent and asymptotically 
efficient estimates of the coefficients, variances and covariances. However, the structural 
VAR representation will be underidentified in the absence of additional constraints. This 
identification problem is solved by imposing at least (n:-n) /2 restrictions on the 
structural model. 
There are several different procedures commonly used to impose restrictions on the 
matrix, Do 
• Sim's Methodology: This procedure uses the Choleski decomposition of Se to 
impose a Wold recursive structure on the matrix Do The results can depend 
highly on the order of the variables. Dharmendra, Kandil, Sharma and 
Trescott (1994) used Sims Methodology to capture the effects of monetary 
and non-monetary factors on the inflation rate. Petrovic and Vujosevic (2000) 
applied a Wald recursive structure and a long run theoretical restriction on the 
50 The likelihood ratio lest, the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) test and the SBC (Schwartz Bayesian 
Criterion) test can be used to determine the lag length of the autoregression process. 
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model of the price level and found that aggregate supply shocks are the 
causes behind the high inflation rate of Yugoslavia. 
• Sims -Bernanke methodology: This procedure uses economic theory to 
impose restrictions on the matrix Do. Domenech, Taguas and Varela (2000) 
use the Ricardian Equivalance Theorem to impose such restrictions on a 
bi varia te model of national saving and the budget deficit. Kim and Roubini 
(2000) use theoretical restrictions on an open economy model to solve 
various puzzles (ie., liquidity puzzle, price puzzle, exchange rate puzzle and 
forward discount puzzle) created by previous studies. 
• Blanchard -Quah decomposition: This decomposition uses restrictions on the 
permanent effects of certain shocks on the levels of 1(1) variables. 
Hoffmaister and Roldos (2001) use long run restrictions to study the effects 
of domestic and external shocks on GDP for Korea and Brazil. In an 
unpublished paper Falk and Lee (2000) use Blanchard -Quah type restrictions 
to capture the effects of aggregate demand, aggregate supply and productivity 
shocks on the inflation and unemployment rates. 
The standard VAR representation of the system is most helpful for estimation and 
forecasting purposes. However, for innovation accounting - impulse response analysis 
and variance decompositions- the structural shocks have to be used. 
Since it is assumed that Xt is covariance stationary, this system can also be 
represented as a vector moving average process (VMA) in terms of the structural shocks, 
e,. This representation is especially useful to capture how structural shocks determine the 
dynamic behaviour of the system. 
The VMA is obtained from the VAR by solving for Xt: 
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A (L) Xt = et 
X, = [A (L)j ' e, 
Recall that et = D0"' e,. Then: 
X[ = [A (L)]'1 Do 'f, 
X, = C(L) e, 
where C (L) =Co +Ci L +C: L" + = ^C,L' . Each C, is an n x n matrix satisfying the 
i=0 
conditions for stationarity and invertibility. 
The effects of the innovations e, on the sequence of the variables of the system {Xt} 
are determined by the elements of the Q's. 
The impulse response of variable m at time t+i to k"1 shock at time t is: 
Ci, mk = .. mJT' m, k =1, n and i = 0,1,2 
The plots of the impulse response functions track down the dynamic responses of the 
variables in X, to the various elements of £t. 
Note that, the impulse response matrices Co, C| are only identified from the VAR 
parameters A„, Ai, ...and, Ie- Hence, if the structural VAR is not identified, it is not 
possible to recover the impulse response functions from the estimated standard VAR 
model. 
Another tool of innovation accounting is the variance decomposition table. The 
elements of this table provide the relative importance of each type of structural shock in 
explaining the dynamic behaviour of each element of X. 
Recall the system in VMA form is: 





The h period ahead forecast error is given by: 
a—1 
Xt+h —Et Xt+h = ^ C, 
1=0 
where, E,Xt+h is the expected value of Xt+h given all the available information at time t. 
Thus, the mean squared error of the h period ahead forecast is: 
h-1 
MSE =E[(Xt+h -EtX,+h) (Xt+h -EtXt+h/] = 
1=0 
Let Ci ms be the (m,s) element of the matrix C, and let a] be the variance of the 
disturbance s. Thus, the h step ahead forecast error variance of the mm variable is given 
as: 
h-l n 
E(Xt+h —EtXt+h) — m-l,...,n 
1=0 i=l 
The forecast error variance decomposition, Y shows the percentage of forecast error 
variance of min variable explained by the k* shock, £|«-
Vector Error Correction Models 
The previous analysis is based on X( being a stationary, 1(0) process. That is, all the 
variables in the system have a tendency to return to their long run mean level. If the X s 
are nonstationary in levels but stationary in first differences, then in general the previous 
analysis can be applied to the first differences of Xt. However, if the variables are 
nonstationary, and there exists a linear combination which is 1(0), then these variables are 
cointegrated. In this case, the vector error correction model is more useful than the vector 
autoregression. 
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If a linear combination of 1(1) variables is stationary, then these variables are 
cointegrated. In case of cointegration, the system should be defined as a vector error 
correction model. 
Recall the reduced form is: 
A (L) is a pth degree matrix polynomial in the lag operator L; A (L) = 2^A,L and et is 
white noise with zero mean and constant variance with a possibility that en is correlated 
with eJt. 
If X, is an nxl vector of I (1) variables and cointegrated of order (1,1) with r 
cointegrating vectors the Granger Representation Theorem says that: 
(i) rank of [A (1)| = r (< n) 
(ii) A { \ )  =  a p '  
where, a  is an nxr matrix of speed of adjustment parameters and P is an n x r matrix 
whose columns represent the cointegration vectors. 
Given the cointegration relations, we can rewrite equation (17) to get the Engle -
Granger vector error correction representation: 
where, A = 1-L is the first difference operator, H ( L )  = ' and F = -A (1). 
Equation (18) states a linear combination of 1(1) variables that is stationary. 
Rewriting equation (18): 
A (L) X, = e. (17) 
and 
AXt = rXt., + H(L)AX, + e, (18) 
rXM= (In - H (L)) AX, - et (19) 
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Since, all the variables on the right hand side of this equation are 1(0), FX,., has to be 
stationary too. F Xt.i is the error correction part of the system with F = -A (I) being 
composed of cointegration and the speed of adjustment vectors. rX,.i=-o^'X,.i corrects 
the change in Xt due to last period's long run equilibrium error. Since each row of the 
matrix T defines the relations between 1(1) variables, F,, Xit-i + F^x^t-i +....+ FinXm-i, the 
rank of F = r e [0, n], determines the number of cointegration relations. If the rank of F is 
zero, the model takes the reduced form VAR representation, AXt=H (L)AXt+ et without 
any cointegration relations between variables. However, if the rank of F is r, there are r 
cointegration vectors and so there exist k = n - r common trends. 
Since the economic interpretations of VAR models are done through innovation 
accounting tools, the data generating process has to be represented as a moving average 
(MA) process. From equation (18): 
AX, = Q (L) e, (20) 
where, Q (L) = [(In - H(L)) -F L(1 -L)"1]"1. Unfortunately, this representation is based 
on the reduced form error terms, which are mutually dependent. 
Let N be an nxn matrix such that NZeNz is diagonal. Given the relation between 
structural and reduced form error terms, e, = Ne, the structural form can be represented 
as: 
AX, = S (L) e,. (21) 
e, = Ne,, S (L) = Q (L) N"1, S (1) = Q(l) N'1 
where, E( £, ) = 0 and E(£,£,') =Zt= In.51 Thus, AX, =S(Z.)e, =Q(L)e, 
51 Engel Granger representation is based on the assumption that cointegration exists. Note that if 
S(l) * 0, {X,l is nonstationary. Moreover, if there are n variables with r cointegration relationship (CI (1,1)) 
then it is true that: (i) rank of S(l) = n-r and (ii) fl'S(l) = 0 
35 
Equation (21) will be used to analyse this system52. Thus, we need to obtain an 
estimate of matrices S(l) and I£. Note that, S(l) is the total impact matrix and S (l)f, 
produces the impulse responses. 
To estimate the system and calculate the matrices Q(L) and so S(L), we used Warne 
(1993) version of Ganger representation theorem. 
Warne (1993) generalizes Campbell and Shi Her (1988)'s work of rewriting VEC 
model as a restricted VAR with n = 2 and r = 1. 
Let a  = [O a \  is an nxn matrix and M be an nxn non-singular matrix given by 
f3'\ where R% is a kxn selection matrix such that Rk = where fi'PL =0, 
fi[fiL = Ik and ffaS(l)*0 for all z'e{l k}. 
And the nxn matrix polynomials. 
G(L) = h o 
0 (1 -L ) I r  
,G1(L) = i \ ~L ) I k  0 
0 L 
Note that the estimated cointegration vector is sufficient to determine the matrices M 
and Gi(L)53. 
Premultiplying both sides of equation (18) with the matrix M, 
M (I -H(L)) AX, = M f X,., + M e, 
P(L) y, = z, (17.1) 
y, = P(L)"'z, 
where, P(L) = M [(I -H(L)M G(L)+e" L], y, = G±(L)MX,, Me, = zt, Iz = E(z,z/) 
52 Engel Granger representation is based on the assumption that cointegration exists. Note that if S( 1) * 0, 
{X, | is nonstationary. Moreover, if there are n variables with r cointegration relationship (CI (1.1)) then it is 
true that: (i) rank of S(l) = n -r and (ii) P'S(l) = 0 
53 A researcher can either estimate the cointegration vector, P' by maximum likelihood estimation technique 
or he /she imposes the steady state values of the relations between variables based on economic theory. 
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Note that, equation (17.1) is a VAR representation conditioned on the cointegration 
vectors. Warne (1993) calls this restricted VAR (RVAR). 
Equation (17.1) provides a simple connection to VMA representation and thus, very 
useful for the purposes of estimation and innovation accounting. Note that, given the 
Granger representation theorem, Q (1) = M~'G(1)P(1)"'M. Therefore, the estimates of S 
( 1 ) and SE can be obtained from the estimates of M, P( 1 ) and Ez. 
As in VAR models, the VECM has an identification problem too. To solve the 
identification problem King, Plosser, Stock, Watson, (1991) (KPSW) imposes two sets of 
restrictions on the system. The first set of restrictions distinguishes the set of permanent 
shocks from the temporary shocks and the second set of restrictions identifies each 
permanent shock -in case there is more than one permanent shock. 
The first set of restrictions is imposed by the cointegration vector. When F has rank r, 
there exists k = n -r common trends, which represent the permanent shocks. Therefore 
cointegration relations impose constraints on the matrix of long run multipliers, S (!) = 
which make it possible to recognize the permanent shocks and so, to decompose 
1=0 
the structural shocks as permanent and temporary: £t =( f,p, e\ )'. Here, ej" is a kx 1 vector 
of permanent shocks and e', is an (n-k)x 1 vector of permanent shocks54. 
Although cointegration recognizes the set of permanent shocks it fails to distinguish 
among them. KPSW imposes the property of no -correlation between the permanent and 
temporary structural shocks ( e? and e' ) to isolate the dynamic response of Xt to each 
permanent shock. 
54 Recall that S(l) = Q(I) N'1 and the nxn matrix N is chosen such that: i) the permanent and temporary 
innovations are independent and ii) the transitory innovations are mutually independent. 
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Assuming there are r cointegrated vectors and k common trends, is a k x I vector 
and: 
S (1) = [A O] 
where, A is an n x k matrix of long run multipliers of permanent shocks whereas, 0, an n 
x (n -k) matrix of zeros which are the long run multipliers for temporary shocks. To 
identify each independent permanent shock, KPSW impose the following structural form: 
A = [ÂnJ 
where. A is an nxk matrix with known parameters, which is chosen such that fi'À = 0. 
Therefore, the innovations to the trends have an economic interpretation55 
H is a k x k lower triangular matrix with ones on the diagonal. The relation, 
AAZ = Q(\yLQ{\)' and the composition of the matrix A, A = |AnJ solves for 
fin' = (À'À)"1 Â'Q(\)LQ(\)' Â(Â'À)"1. However, in order to estimate we need to impose 
additional restrictions on matrix FI such as Cholesky decomposition or Sims -Bemanke 
decomposition. In this paper we used Cholesky decomposition of H. It is crucial to note 
that Cholesky decomposition of FE need not indicate a recursive structure on matrix A. 
Matrix A determines the effects of common trends in the system. 
55 Note that for k = 1, n is an identity matrix, A = A. 
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CHAPTER 4. MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
Structural Vector Autoregression Model Identification Restrictions 
This study uses multi -equation systems approaches to study the effects of monetary 
and fiscal policies on price level determination. As explained in Chapter Three, both 
structural vector autoregressions and structural vector error correction models will be 
used with the theoretical properties of the monetarist, unpleasant monetarist and fiscal 
theories of price level supplying the identifying restrictions. 
Recall that the First order conditions of the household optimisation problem generate 
the demand for goods, real balances, and government bonds. In that study, the 
government policy is defined such that the government issues bonds and collects taxes to 
pay off its existing debt. Therefore, under zero government expenditures, g, = 0, 
aggregate supply is equal to the household consumption expenditures: yt = ct. Following 
the model developed in Chapter Two, we can define a macro model given monetary and 
fiscal policies, output growth (equation (5")), money demand (equation (6)) and the 
budget constraint equation (equation (7)). As before R, is the nominal interest rate; 
in, = is the real balances; b, = — is the real outstanding government debt and 
P, P, 






b ,  = -txt + 6,_, — + m,_, m, (7) 
Note that under a constant output growth rate and perfect foresight equation (5XX) 
gives the relation between today's interest rate and inflation rate. 
Recall that given these relations, the determination of the price level depends on the 
joint monetary -fiscal policy. Therefore, it is possible to analyse inflation rate dynamics 
using a structural vector autoregression model by imposing Sims -Bernanke type 
restrictions supplied by the theoretical properties of monetarist theory, unpleasant 
monetarist theory and the fiscal theory of the price level. 
Monetarist Theory 
As discussed in Chapter Two the monetarist theory argues that in a Ricardian 
environment with active monetary -passive fiscal policy the price level is determined by 
the monetary authority. The monetary authority sets its policy variable and leaves the 
fiscal authority with the burden of the solvency of the government budget constraint. The 
passive fiscal authority sets its policy variable to pay off its debt. 
Focusing on the contemporaneous relations this model can be defined by the 
following implicit functions, (*, k =1,...4: 
y, = Es 
Jit =f '(Rt) + Ed 
Rt=  emp 
mt = f3 (Rt, yt) + emd 
tx, = f1 (bt) + efp 
bt= f (Ttt, mt) + Eqd 
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where, es is the aggregate supply shock, Ed is the aggregate demand shock, Emp is the 
monetary policy shock, Efp is the fiscal policy shock, Emd is the money demand shock and 
ebd is the bond demand shock. 
This system of six equations and six variables, Xt = (yt, Rt, m, ,txt, bj can be 
analysed using a SVAR approach with the following constraints the theory imposes on 
the system: 
The contemporaneous value of yt is affected by no other variable 
The contemporaneous value of 7% is affected by Rt 
The contemporaneous value of R, is affected by no other variable 
The contemporaneous value of mt is affected by yt, Rt 
The contemporaneous value of tx, is affected by bt, n,, mt, yt, R, 
The contemporaneous value of b, is affected by n,, mt, yt, Rt 
Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic 
In Chapter Two, the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic is defined as a weak form of 
the FTPL since it is driven by a Ricardian policy with active fiscal and passive monetary 
policies. An active fiscal policy, defined as tx being an exogenous variable, will force the 
monetary authority to set interest rate such that the government budget constraint will be 
satisfied for every price level. Following the discussion in Chapter Two, this model can 
be defined by the following system of implicit equations: 
yt = Eg 
Tt, =f"(Rt) + ED 
R,= f^(y,, tx,) + emp 
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MT = f3/(Rt, y,) + EMD 
tX, = £FP 
b,= f5/(7tt, m,) + BBD 
Hence, the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic can be analysed in a system of six 
equations and six variables, X, = (yt, Rt, m, ,tx,, b,) using an S VAR approach, with the 
following constraints: 
The contemporaneous value of y, is affected by no other variable 
The contemporaneous value of n, is affected by Rt, y, and tx, 
The contemporaneous value of R, is affected by y, and tx. 
The contemporaneous value of m, is affected by y, and R, 
The contemporaneous value of tx, is affected by no other variable 
The contemporaneous value of b, is affected by 7t,, m, y,, R, and tx, 
Fiscal Theory of Price Level 
The strong from FTPL is defined in a non -Ricardian environment which allows for 
active fiscal and monetary policies. Under these policies, the price level is determined by 
the fiscal policy variable. Guided by the theoretical discussions in Chapter Two, such a 
model can be defined by the following system of six equations: 
y, = Es 
n, =f '"(y,, tx,) + ED 
Rt = EMP 
m, = f3//(Rt, yt) + EMD 
tx, = EFP 
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b, = f5//(7tt, m,) + ebd 
Given these contemporaneous relations it is possible to define the FTPL in a six 
equation -six variable system with the following constraints: 
The contemporaneous value of y, is affected by no other variable 
The contemporaneous value of 7t, is affected by yt and tx. 
The contemporaneous value of R, is affected by no other variable 
The contemporaneous value of m, is affected by yt, R, 
The contemporaneous value of tx, is affected by no other variable 
The contemporaneous value of b, is affected by m,, y,, R, and tx 
Vector Error Correction Model Identification Restrictions 
Chapter Three discussed the importance of common trends on multi -equation 
modelling. Due to previous econometric studies on the cointegration relationships 
between the interest rate and the inflation rate (i.e., the Fisher Equation) and between real 
balances, income and the interest rate (i.e, the money demand equation), we will also 
consider structural vector error correction models (SVECM) in case we find evidence for 
the existence of cointegration relations. 
Note that the long run behaviour of our model can be defined by the following 
implicit functions 
x ,=g l (R , ) ,  m t  =  g 2 ( y t ,R t ) ,  b t  =g \R t , x , )  




Recall that in a Ricardian environment, when the government is following an active 
monetary -passive fiscal policy, the price level is determined by the monetary authority. 
We defined an active monetary policy as the monetary authority setting Rt at a 
predetermined level R , R, = R' and a passive fiscal policy as the fiscal authority setting 
taxes  g iven the outstanding government  debt ,  b ,  and real  balances ,  m t ,  t x t  =  g  4 ( ;r , ,  R, ,y t )  •  
Therefore, in the long run, the monetarist model is defined by the following implicit 
equations: 
Tt ,  =g \R , ) ,  m,  =  g ' ( y , .R , ) ,  b ,  =g \R„n , ) ,  t x ,  =g \n , ,R , ,  v , ) ,  R,  =  R ' ,  =  y ,  
If the variables in this system of equations are 1(1) processes then the system implies 
the existence of 4 cointegration relationships: interest rate and inflation rate (Rand#); 
interest rate, real money supply and income (R ,m , _y ); government debt, interest rate and 
inflation rate (b, R, Jt)\ tax receipts, inflation rate, interest rate and income (tx,#, R, y). 
In a system of six variables ( y ,n ,  R, m , tx , b), the existence of four common trends 
implies that the system is driven by four transitory shocks and two permanent shocks. We 
define the permanent shocks as technology and monetary policy shocks, which we label 
The monetarist theory argues that monetary shocks have no long run effect on 
income and that technology shocks are ineffective on the long run interest rate and the 
inflation rate. Therefore, for the vector of variables, Xt = (yt, Rt, n,, m,, tx,, b,), the long 
run structure of a Ricardian environment with an active monetary -passive fiscal policy 




where, x  represents the unrestricted parameters and the interpretation of the matrix A was 
discussed previously in Chapter Three. 
Fiscal Theory of Price Level 
As opposed to the monetarist theory, the FTPL argues that in a non -Ricardian 
environment with active monetary and fiscal policies, the price level determined by the 
fiscal authority. In Chapter Two we explained that in a non -Ricardian environment it is 
possible for the monetary (fiscal) authority to set its policy variable independent of the 
other authority's actions, so that R, = Rj and tx, = tx'. Recall that, under these policies, 
the price level is determined from the demand side, by the solvency of the intertemporal 
budget constraint. 
Therefore, the FTPL is defined by the following implicit equations of steady state 
variables: 
K,  =g l ' ( y , ' t x , ) '  =& ' (%,%)  ,  b ,  =g \R t ,X t ) ,  t x  =  t x ' ,  R ,  =R ' t , y t ^=y t  
With an active fiscal -monetary policy this system of equation exhibits three 
cointegration relationships if the six variables are 1(1): inflation rate, income and tax 
revenue(sr,yjx) ; real money supply, interest rate and income (R,m,yY, interest rate 








b) with three common trends has three permanent shocks, which we name technology, 
m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  a n d  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  s h o c k s ,  £ , p  =  ( £ * " , £ f  ) .  
Following KPSW, the FTPL imposes the following long run restrictions on the 
system of equations: 
A = 
1 0 0 
x 0 x  
0 1 0 
x  x  0 
0 0 1 
0 .t 0 
1 0 0 
n:i i o 
n3l n32 l 
where x represent the unrestricted parameters 
As defined in detail in Chapter Two, the FTPL argues that monetary policy has no 
effect on fiscal policy variables, income and the inflation rate. Fiscal policy also does not 
affect income or the monetary policy variables but does affect the inflation rate. 
Moreover, due to the independence of the authorities, the technology shocks do not affect 
the interest rate, government revenue and government debt. 
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CHAPTER 5. DATA 
We used U.S. quarterly data for the period, 1959:1 -1998:4 for each of the following 
series. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP, chained 1996 dollars), GDP price deflator, 
three month Treasury Bill rate (secondary market). Ml (seasonally adjusted), government 
receipts and gross federal debt, which are used for income, price level, interest rate, 
money supply, government revenue and outstanding government debt, respectively. 
These series were obtained from the web pages of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 
the Federal Reserve Board and Economagic. Following KPSW (1991) we calculated the 
annual percentage inflation rate as: n, = 400*(Iog(pt ) - log(p,_, )). Ml, government 
receipts and government debt are divided by the price level to get real balances, real tax 
revenue and the real debt. 
To learn the processes that generated these realisations and make reasonable 
predictions, we need to assume that at least part of the data generating process is stable 
overtime. These stability assumptions are called stationarity conditions. Since a time 
series data is regarded as a collection of random variables with a joint probability density 
function (pdf) defining the structure of the process, stationarity conditions are actually 
restrictions on the joint pdf s. 
The data generating process Xt is strictly / strongly / completely stationary if the joint 
probability distributions depends only on the time intervals separating the observations, 
not on the date of the observations: F(xti xm) = F(x,i+k,....,xm+k). for all positive 
integers n and integers k, ti,....,t„. A much less restricted definition is X,beingcovariance 
/second order / weakly stationary. Xt is covariance stationary if the marginal distributions 
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for xi, have a constant mean, a constant variance and the autocorrelation function 
depends only on the time lag -not on the starting point of the observations: M< = H and 
(%" = cr, Px(t)A«+k) = Pk for all integers t and k. 
If the original data have a non-constant mean or an increasing variance, a 
transformation of the data may solve the problem. Differencing the time series can often 
handle the problem of a non -constant mean, whereas, taking the logarithm can stabilize 
variability, simplify the structure of the model, change the shape of the trend line and 
change the distribution of the residuals. 
Following the collections of our data, we checked for the stationarity properties of 
our series. Since the original series for income, real balances, real government revenue 
and real federal debt indicated time -dependent variance we worked with their 
logarithms. 
y : log (GDP), m: log (Ml) -log (p), 
tx: log (government receipts) -log (p) b: log (federal debt) -log (p) 
The basic statistics and the plots of the data are given in Table 5.1 and 
Figures 5.1 
Table 5.1. U.S Data 
Variables Mean Std Error Minimum Maximum 
y 8.434 0.371 7.728 9.067 
7t 3.918 2.515 0 11.795 
R 5.956 2.652 2.303 15.053 
m 3.171 0.191 2.939 3.580 
tx 2.517 0.416 1.694 3.253 
b 3.021 0.521 2.554 3.989 
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Figure 5.1. U.S Data 
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Figure 5.1. (continued) 
The plots for y, m. tx and b indicate non-stationarity due to non constant means. For 
inflation and the interest rate the situation is not very clear. However, for all these series 
we followed the previous studies and regard them as nonstationary due to 
non -constant mean56. To capture the stationary component of these series we worked 
with first differences. 
Table 5.2 summarizes the statistical properties of the differenced data series. Figures 
5.2 graph these series. Note that, the graphs of the first differences appear to display 
stationary patterns fluctuating around their mean value zero with neither their mean nor 
their variance appearing to be time dependent. 
Table 5.2. First Differences 
I Variables Mean Std Error Minimum Maximum 
Dy 0.008 0.009 -0.020 0.037 
On 0.006 1.152 -3.519 3.336 
DR 0.009 0.825 -3.736 4.459 
Dm 0.003 0.011 -0.027 0.037 
Dtx 0.009 0.019 -0.084 0.099 
Db 0.008 0.013 -0.018 0.054 
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Figure 5.2. First Differences 
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Figure 5.2. (continued) 
In general nonstationarity due to an increasing mean (which appears to be the case 
for at least y, m, tx and b) may be due to a deterministic time trend or a stochastic trend, 
which is expressed as a unit root process with drift. Even series without trend behaviour 
(e.g., 7t and R) may be best characterized as unit root processes. Differencing the data 
series to attain stationary behaviour is most appropriate for unit root processes 51. To see 
if our nonstationary series have unit roots, we conducted Dickey -Fuller (DF), 
Augmented Dickey - Fuller (ADF) and Phillips -Perron unit root tests. 
Unit Root Tests 
Let {xt} be an AR(1) process58. 
x, = + £, (22) 
Assuming e, is white noise, the {xt} sequence is covariance stationary if |a,| is less 
than 1. In this case, we can derive the infinite -order moving average representation of xt: 
57 Unit roots in the data generating process creates nonstationarity in VAR models. 
58 In time series models stationarity of a process is determined from the autoregressive part of the model. 
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jc, = ( 1  -a ,LY l e ,  (23) 
x, =«,£•,+tifc,_2+... (24) 
Note that for 0 < |ai| < 1, the effect of a shock decreases overtime. 
If in (22) a, = 1, so that the AR process has a unit root, the data is generated by a 
f 
nonstationary process. In particular the model becomes, x, = assuming xo = 0, and 
i=i 
the variance becomes time dependent, increasing as t increases. 
Under the null hypothesis of a unit root (a, = 1), the distribution of the t -ratio is non 
standard50. The Dickey -Fuller (DF), Augmented Dickey -Fuller (ADF) and Phillips -
Perron (PP) unit root tests provide appropriate test procedures. 
Dickey -Fuller Unit Root Test 
In their Monte Carlo study, Dickey and Fuller (1979) provided the limiting 
distribution of the t statistic for the OLS estimator of the slope coefficient in (22) under 
the null of a unit root. They worked with three different autoregressive models of the 
data generating process and three null hypotheses. The models are: 
At, = qx,_l +e, (25) 
Ax ,  =a 0 +qx ,_ ,+£ ,  (26) 
Ax, = «„ + <7X,_, + a2t + e, (27) 
59 OLS models hypothesis testing requires the variables to be stationary and thus the error terms 
representing the deviations from the model decay overtime. 
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where, A.t, = x, - .t,_, and q = a, -1 -60 The corresponding null hypotheses are: 
Ho: </ = 0 (equation 25), Ho: q = 0 (equation 26) and Ho: q = 0,a2 = 0 (equation 27). In this 
setting testing for the existence of a unit root (a,=l) is equivalent to testing if Ho: q =0. 
Let r, Tu, tt represent the t statistics for OLS slope coefficients from estimating 
equations (25), (26) and (27) respectively. Dickey and Fuller (1979) derived the limiting 
distributions these statistics under the null, which can be used to derive critical regions for 
the one -sided test of Ho against the alternative q < 0 (a, < 1). 
We applied the Dickey -Fuller test to our data series. The calculated x, and tt 
statistics for the variables y, Jt, R, m. tx and b indicate the existence of a unit root in each 
of these series. 
For the models with / without constant and with trend we failed to reject the null 
hypothesis of unit root at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels for all series61. Similar 
results are obtained for the model with a constant but with no trend term for the series y, 
R, m, tx and b. Although, the statistics for n are greater than the critical values -2.58 
(10% level) and -2.89 (5% level), we fail to reject the null hypothesis of unit root at the 
1% significance level. 
60 From equation 1: 
x ,  =  a l x ,_ l +£ ,  
x, — j t,_, =alx,.l -x,_t + £, 
Ax, =(fl, -l)x„, + £, 
61 Empirical Cumulative Distribution: 
Sample size: 100 0.01 0.05 0.10 
T -2.60 -1.95 -1.61 
-3.51 -2.89 -2.58 
TT -4.04 -3.45 -3.15 
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Table 5.3. Dickey -Fuller Unit Root Tests 
y Tt R m tx b 
r 11.49 -1.54 -0.71 3.34 5.95 9.55 
Tu -1.31 -3.05 -2.11 0.13 -0.96 4.38 
Tt -2.16 -3.08 -1.95 -0.99 -2.69 -2.19 
Augmented Dickey -Fuller Unit Root Test 
To allow for serially correlated changes, consider the following extensions of 
equations (25M27): 
k 
Ax, = qx,_{ + £ frAx,-,+i + % (28) 
1=2 
k 
Ax, =a0+ qx,_x + ^  PtAx,_„{ + £, (29) 
1=2 
k 
Ax, =a0+ qx,_x + a2r + £ + £, (30) 
i=2 
where, as before q = 0 under the unit root null hypothesis. Under the alternative 
hypothesis, q < 0 and equations (28) -(30) can be rewritten to express x, as a (trend) 
stationary k -th order autoregressive process. Dickey and Fuller showed that the limiting 
null distributions of the t -ratios for q derived from the OLS estimates of (28) -(30) do 
not depend on k and are equivalent to the Dickey -Fuller distributions associated with the 
t -ratios for q in (25) -(27). Hence, the Augmented Dickey -Fuller (ADF) unit root test 
is actually the modification of the DF test allowing for (k) lagged levels instead of 1. 
Since the distribution is the same as before, the ADF tests use the same critical values 
as the DF tests. Table 5.4 shows the calculated ADF statistics for a model without 
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deterministic parts and a lag length determined by the AIC model selection criteria62. 
Given the lag length, the calculated ADF statistics for all models fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root for; y, m, tx and b at the 10% significance level and for R for the 
model with constant and no trend at the 5% significance level. 
Table 5.4. Augmented Dickey -Fuller Unit Root Test 
Variable y Tt R m tx b 
Lag length l 2 7 1 0 2 
No constant + No 6.36 -0.94 -0.58 1.39 5.96 2.26 
trend 
Lag length 
Constant + no trend 



















Phillips -Perron Unit Root Test 
The Phillips -Perron unit root test is an extension of the DF test and an alternative to 
the ADF test. It extends the DF test by allowing for serial correlation in (25) -(27) but, in 
contrast to the ADF test, does not require us to parameterise the serial correlation. It also 
allows for less restrictive assumptions on the error process, allowing the errors to be 
weakly dependent (as opposed to stationary) and to have heterogenous distributions. 
The Phillips -Perron test statistics are the OLS t -ratios for q from equations 
(25) -(27), transformed to account for possible serial correlation and /or 
heteroscedasticity in the error terms in these equations. Call these statistics r, Tu*, and 
62 For given lag length four the ADF test statistics for all series fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit 
root 
Variable y 71 R m tx b 
Lag length 4 4 4 4 4 4 
No constant + trend 4.19 -0.98 -0.78 1.28 3.96 1.81 
Constant + no trend -0.70 -1.86 -2.15 -0.98 -0.55 0.19 
Constant + trend -2.66 -1.91 -2.04 -2.23 -2.50 -1.85 
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tt . Under the unit root null, the limiting distributions of theses transformed -ratios are 
the corresponding Dickey -Fuller distributions. 
.r, = a'0+a'lx,_l+rj, 
.t, = ti0" + + a l ( t - T / 2 )  +  r j ,  
Our results are given in Table 5.5. As in the DF test, the calculated PP statistics for 
the model with trend fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all series at the 
10% significance level. The results are same for all series -except inflation, for a model 
without trend. For inflation the PP statistics without trend reject the null hypothesis of a 
unit root at the 5% and 10% significance levels, but not at the 1% level. 
Table 5.5. Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test 
Variable y 71 R m tx b 
H0: a\ = 1 " ' -32 -3.06 -2.11 0.14 -0.97 4.40 
Hu: a{ - 1 -2.18 -3.10 -1.96 -1.00 -2.71 -2.21 
Cointegration Test 
The tests we have applied concluded that the series we are working with have unit 
roots. In our analysis of multi -equation models we have argued that for the reliability of 
our results it is crucial to incorporate the cointegration relationships -if there are any, and 
work with VECM instead of VAR models. Previous econometric studies and the 
economic theory we developed earlier imply the existence of some common trends in the 
system of six variables we are working with. Consequently, we applied Engle - Granger, 
Phillips - Ouliaris and Johansen cointegration tests to search the data for cointegration 
relationships. 
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Engle -Granger and Phillips -Ouliaris Cointegration Tests 
These are both single -equation residual based cointegration tests. First ordinary 
least squares is applied to estimate the assumed long run relationship among the variables. 
Then, a unit root test is applied to the residuals to test the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration. The Engle -Granger methodology uses a DF unit root test whereas the 
Phillips -Ouliaris methodology applies a PP unit root test in this two -step procedure. 
However, the critical values for these tests are not the same as the critical values used in 
standard DF and PP unit root tests because the tests are being applied to the residuals 
rather than the unobservable cointegration errors. One important difference between these 
two methods is the issue of invariance with respect to the selection of the regression's 
dependent variable. In small sample the Engle -Granger test results are sensitive to the 
choice of the dependent variable. In contrast, the Phillips -Ouliaris multivariate trace test 
is invariant to the normalization of the cointegration relation. Below we describe these 
tests in more detail. 
For a given regression equation. 
where, zt can be vector -process. If the variables wt and zt are cointegrated of order (1,1) 
(CI (1,1)) the deviations from their long run relation will go back to their mean level. That 
is, the error process in (33) is stationary. 
The model is fit by OLS and a unit root test is applied to the residuals { ê,}. which 
are modelled as: 
w
, = A+ /?,:, +e, (33) 
té, +v, (34) 
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The Engle -Granger Methodology uses DF statistics to test the null hypothesis of a 
unit root, i.e., the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Ho: qi = 0. If we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis, we conclude the residuals have a unit root and thus, the variables in 
question are not cointegrated. In contrast, if the unit root is rejected, we conclude that wt 
and z, are cointegrated of order (1.1). 
Note that, if in (34) { v,} is not a white noise process the ADF unit root test is used 
instead of the DF test. Thus, we estimate equation (35) instead of (34): 
té, = + v, (35) 
i-i 
Since we are calculating the unit root test statistics from the estimated { v,} sequence, 
rather than from the actual (unobserved) sequence, the Dickey -Fuller table of critical 
values cannot be used. For cointegration tests, the appropriate distributions are provided 
by Engel -Yoo (1987)63. 
The Phillips -Ouliaris multivariate trace statistics uses orthogonal regression, 
which is invariant to the normalization of the equation. 
Let the data generating process z, = (w, h// be generated as: 
=Vc,_, +ç, 
where, Ç, has zero mean and a finite variance. 
The Phillips -Ouliaris multivariate trace, Pz statistics is64: 
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No. of variables 1% 5% 10% 
2 -4.07 -3.37 -3.03 
3 -4.45 -3.93 -3.59 
4 -4.75 -4.22 -3.89 
5 -5.18 -4.58 -4.26 
64 In their paper Phillips and Ouliaris provides two more tests for cointegration. However, they do not have 
the property of invariance to order of variables in the equation 
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where, /Q = t T-±ll +T~TL i is the estimate of the covariance 
V f=( 5=1 f=,T+| 
matrix of zt and 
z \ ->  
T 
y -
v f-i y 
is the observed sample moment matrix65. 
Cointegration in the model will be reflected in the sample moment matrix and so in 
the P^ statistics. 
Phillips -Ouliaris provides the asymptotic critical values for this test statistic. The 
null hypothesis of no cointegration is not rejected if the computed value of statistics is 
smaller than the appropriate critical value66. 
The first step in the Engle -Granger and Phillips -Ouliaris tests is to estimate the 
long run relationship among the variables. The regressions that we estimated are based on 
the steady state relationships defined by our economic theory. These relationships are: 
1) 7t, =aR, +et 
2) m , =  p y y  +  p R R , + e ,  
3) b ,  =PrR, + e ,  
4) tx, =?vr, +Y rR, +Y v y ,  + £ ,  
jtl = 1- s/(/ + l) is the lag window (Newey and West (1987)) 
' Phillips and Ouliaris ( 1990) 
Right hand side var. 0.05 0.1 0.01 
N=1 40.8 33.9 55.2 
N=2 71.2 62.1 89.6 
N=3 109.74 99.2 131.5 
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5) n, =A,y, +Àjx, +e, 
Table 5.6 provides the test statistics calculated from the application of the Engle -
Granger and Phillips -Ouliaris methodologies to these cointegration relations. 
The estimation results are as follows: 
Cointegration relation between interest rate and inflation rate: 
Recall that, for a separable utility function equation (5) is the Fisher equation, 
defining a positive long run relationship between the nominal interest rate and the 
inflation rate. According to the Fisher equation, in the long run the real interest rate is 
independent of the inflation rate. Therefore, an increase in the inflation rate is fully offset 
by an equal increase in the nominal interest rate. Our estimate of that long run 
relationship 
• n, =0.22 + 0.62/?, 
(0.6) (10.7) 
indicates a positive relationship between the interest rate and the inflation rate, though 
the coefficient is well less than one67. The Engle -Granger cointegration test using the DF 
statistic rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels. The Engle -Granger cointegration test using the ADF statistic for models with 
constant only rejects the no cointegration null at the 10% significance level with lag 
length equal toi. The calculated PO statistics reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration at all standard significance levels. Therefore, the results from the EG and 
PO residual -based cointegration tests suggests that, contrary to our theory, the interest 
rate and the inflation rate are not cointegrated. This also means that there is not a stable 
Fisher equation for the U S economy over the sample period. 
67 The values in parentheses are the t -values. 
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Table 5.6. Engel -Granger and Phillips -Ouliaris Methodology 
Relation 1 2 3 4 5 
DF -4.15 -2.058 -1.65 -1.42 -3.01 
ADF 
Lag 1 -3.22 -2.38 -1.93 -1.30 -2.31 
Lag 4 -1.86 -2.26 -1.69 -0.87 -1.81 
Lag 8 -1.39 -2.52 -1.66 -0.74 -1.77 
PO 58.13 39.57 70.43 74.56 31.54 
Cointegration relation between real balances, interest rate and income: 
Households hold money for its purchasing power. Therefore, the demand for money 
is the demand for real balances. Economic theory argues for a positive (negative) relation 
between money demand and income (interest rate). Since the interest rate is the cost of 
holding money the trade off between cost and benefit of holding money imposes a 
decreasing money demand due to higher interest rates. However, an increase in income 
increases the demand for money for transaction purposes and so households demand more 
money as their income increases. The estimated money demand function is 
• m, =-0.98-0.03R, + 0.5lv, 
(-9.1) (-16.1) (39.2) 
Our estimation results reflect the behaviour economic theory indicates. However, in 
contrast to previous studies we could not find evidence for cointegration among these 
variables. The DF, ADF and PO tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
at all standard significance levels. 
Cointegration relation between government debt, interest rate and inflation rate: 
The demand for government bonds depends on its yield, the interest rate. A higher 
nominal interest rate (inflation rate) increases (decreases) the real interest rate, which 
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increases (decreases) the demand for government bonds. The estimated bond demand 
function is: 
• b, =3.11 + 0.06/?, -0.12*, 
(33.7) (3.4) (-6.1) 
The signs on the coefficients are consistent with the theory, although the coefficient 
on the inflation rate is twice as large in absolute value as the coefficient on the interest 
rate. Although the DF and ADF tests do not reject the null hypothesis, the PO 
multivariate trace tests reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 1% and 5% 
significance level. 
Cointegration relation between government revenue, inflation rate, interest rate and 
income: 
The government sets its tax revenue to guarantee the solvency of the government 
budget constraint. Recall that taxes are defined as units of consumption goods. Thus, 
higher income, which is equivalent to an increase in the supply of goods in our pure 
exchange economy, leads to higher tax revenue. 
The Ricardian government is responsible for the solvency of its budget constraint, 
1 R 
- T ,  = » / ,  m ,  ,  + b ,  — — b ,  ,. High inflation rate decreases the real value of 
n, n, 
I R 
government debt, —wi,_, +-±±6,_,thus requires less tax revenue. Hence, taxes decrease 
n, ft, 
due to a higher (lower) inflation rate (interest rate)..Similarly, a higher interest rate lowers 
money and bond seignorage, bt ——6,_, and so, requires higher taxes. The estimated 
Ht 
relationship between tax revenue, the inflation rate, the interest rate, and income is 
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• tx, =-6.9 + 0.006*, - 0.002/?, +1.12y, 
(149.3) (5.73) (-1.54) (198.5) 
The DF and ADF, tests reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% 
significance level whereas the PO test rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegraion at all 
significance levels. However, note that the signs of the estimated coefficients on the 
inflation rate and the interest rate are incorrect. 
Cointegration relation between inflation rate, income and government revenue: 
It is assumed that households are rational and their current demands are determined 
by their current and expected futureincome. In a Ricardian environment, where the fiscal 
authority is bound by the solvency of the government budget constraint, a rational 
household knows that lower taxes today will cause higher taxes tomorrow and will leave 
the present value of its lifetime income unchanged. However, in a non -Ricardian 
environment, with active fiscal and monetary policies lower taxes today do not 
necessarily lead to higher taxes tomorrow. A rational household knowing that, will realize 
the increase in his lifetime income and will increase his demand which will in turn cause 
a higher inflation rate. Therefore, we expect that an increase in current taxes or a decrease 
in current income will decrease the inflation rate. Our estimated relationship is 
• Jt, = 294.6 + 42. Ux, - 47.02y, 
(6.38) (6.34) (-6.32) 
For this long run relationship the DF and ADF tests do not reject the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration, whereas the PO test rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 
all significance levels. Note that the signs of the estimated slope coefficient are 
inconsistent with our theory. 
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The estimated coinetgration relationships and the results of the residual -based test 
are not very good from our point of view. In most cases, the test results are either mixed 
or do not reject the no -cointegration null. And, in a number of cases, the point estimates 
of the slope coefficient are of the wrong sign. 
The Johansen Methodology 
In Chapter Three we explained that the rank of the matrix F in the following multi -
equation system determines the number of cointegration relationships in the vector 
process X,: 
AX, = rxM + Zr,AXM+e, 
i=l 
As opposed to the previous cointegration tests, which were single equation, two -step 
estimation procedures, Johansen's (1990) algorithm uses the maximum likelihood 
estimation technique to estimate the matrix, F and its rank, leading to a test of the 
number of (linearly independent) cointegrating relationships and estimates of these 
relationships. The procedure is as follows: 
First, we determine the lag length of the system using a model selection criteria such 
as AIC, SBC or the likelihood ratio test. Our results for the system of 6 equations y, Tt, R, 
m, tx, b indicated that the model with / without drift has lag length 4( 1 ) according to AIC 
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(SBC)68. 
Then we estimated the selected model using maximum likelihood estimation based 
upon the Gaussian innovation process and found the characteristic roots, A of the 
estimated matrix F. 
Johansen formed two types of statistics to check for cointegration, A^ and A,mrr. 
The /t1113X statistic is used to test for the existence of r against the alternative of r+1 
cointegration vectors: 
Ho: r = 0. HA: r = 1: Ho: r = 1. HA: r = 2: Ho: r = 2. HA: r = 3: 
=-7"ln(l-/ir.,) 
where T = number of observations and Xr denotes the r -th eigenvalue when the 
eigenvalues are arranged in descending order..m = number of characteristic roots 
The A,nu., statistics are used to test if there are at most, r cointegration vectors. That is, 
H»: r = 0. HA: r # 0: Ho: r <= 1, HA: r > 1 ; Ho: r <= 2, HA: r > 2: 
À r o , r  = - r X l n ( l - 4 )  
j = r*| 
Note that to test for no cointegration relations among the set of variables we can use 
either or both of these statistics. The asymptotical null distribution of these statistics are 
provided by Johansen and Juselius ( 1990) 
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Lag Length With constant Without constant 
(AIC/SBC) (AIC / SBC) 
Lag 12 -5599.13 / -4289.32 -5574.94 / -4283.08 
Lag 8 -5721.26 / -4834.18 -5804.48 / -5086.37 
Lag 4 -5895.54 / -5439.03 -5883.47 / -5445.21 
Lag 1 -5858.52 / -5729.89 -5802.12 / -5691.87 
66 
The results are reported in Table 5.7. For the model without drift (with drift) and 
using a lag length one, our results indicate that there are 4 (3) cointegration relationships. 
Table 5.7. Johansen Methodology 
Lag I /no constant in the system 
Ho: r 
^inax ^irtur crit. val. max crit. val. trace 
0 200.42 330.51 22.76 78.30 
1 61.38 130.09 18.96 55.54 
2 40.24 68.71 15.00 36.58 
3 21.18 28.47 11.23 21.58 
4 6.72 7.29 7.37 10.35 
5 0.57 0.57 2.98 2.98 
Lag 1 /constant in the system 
Ho: r 
^ITULX ^triue crit. val. max crit. val. trace 
0 152.11 264.32 24.63 89.37 
I 62.44 112.21 20.90 64.74 
2 30.76 49.77 17.14 43.84 
3 12.00 19.01 13.39 26.70 
4 6.66 7.01 10.60 13.31 
5 0.35 0.35 2.71 2.71 
As described in previous sub -section, our theory implies that there are five 
cointegration relationships among the variables in our system. The Johansen tests indicate 
that there are at most four and as few as three cointegration relationships. Thus, these 
results are not fully supportive of our theory. 
Conclusion 
Chapter Four indicated the importance of whether there are cointegration relations in 
a multi -equation systems analysis. Therefore, in Chapter Five we tested the long run 
relations we suspect. The number of cointegration relationships we found varied across 
the different tests we applied. In addition, in a number of cases the estimated coefficients 
in the cointegrating relations were of wrong sign. It is possible that the differences in 
results and the sign inconsistencies may be explained by the inadequacy of the sample 
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size or the low test power rather than by inadequacies of the theory. However, we 
proceed with both a structural VAR model and structural VECM in the next chapter. 
68 
CHAPTER 6. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
In this chapter, we report and analyse the results from estimating the multivariate 
models that were introduced in previous chapters. First, we modelled the U.S. economy 
using the structural vector autoregressions (SVAR) described in Chapter Four for each of 
the competing theories: monetarist theory, unpleasant monetarist arithmetic and the 
FTPL. First differences of y, Tt, R, m, tx and b were fit by FIML to a first -order system 
(based upon AIC and SBC lag length tests) with an intercept in each equation. We 
estimated the system by FIML since our models are over -identified.69 70 Second, we 
incorporated the cointegration relationships defined under the monetarist theory and 
FTPL and modelled the economy as a structural VECM (SVECM) with lag length one 
and an intercept in each equation, following the estimation procedure described in 
Chapter Four. 
The estimation results, which are summarized by the impulse response functions and 
variance decomposition tables, are given in Appendix C (SVAR) and Appendix D 
(SVECM). We discuss these results below. 
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System is over -identified if there are more than (n2-n)/2 restrictions 
Lag With constant Without constant 
Length (AlC/SBC) (AlC/SBC) 
Lag 12 -5470.2 / -4163.4 -5446.3 / -4139.4 
Lag 8 -5632.2 / -4747.1 -5610.6 / -4725.5 
Lag 4 -5803.8 /-5348.2 -5773.5 /-5317.9 
Lag 1 -5879.1 / -5750.7 -5838.2 / -5709.8 
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Structural Vector Autoregression Model Estimation Results 
Before looking at the impulse responses and the variance decomposition tables, we 
applied Granger causality tests to check for the explanatory power of a lagged variable in 
a regression. The stochastic process ç, "'Granger causes" the process ht if in the regression 
of h, on its own past history and the past history of £t, the past history of is irrelevant. 
That is, Granger causes h, if in the regression: 
^ — £10 (3)^,-3 ^i2+ ....+ eht 
at least some of the coefficients, ç u ( l ) , ç n ( 2 ) , ç u ( 3 )  are significantly different from 
zero. The null hypothesis that does not Granger cause ht can be tested by a standard F -
test of the null hypothesis, H0 :ç,,(l) = #,,(2) = £,,(3) = = 0. 
This idea can be extended directly to the case where there are additional lagged 
explanatory variables in the regression, which is the form of the test that we apply. That 
is, we regress each dependent variable (in differenced form) on its own lagged values and 
the lagged values of the other five variables in the system. For each equation we apply the 
F -test to the lagged values of each of the six variables (i.e., the own lagged values and 
the lagged values of the other five variables). The results are reported below in Table 6.1. 
Using a 10 percent significance level, the Granger causality test results indicate that 
each variable causes itself. In addition, y granger causes m and tx; R Granger causes all 
variables except y; m Granger causes y, it and R; tx Granger causes m and b Granger 
causes n, R and m. 
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Table 6.1. Granger - Causality Test Results' : 




y 71 R m tx b 
y 7.01 0.7 2.5 3.6 10.6 0.5 
(0.08) (0.39) (0.11) (0.06) (0.00) (0.45) 
71 0.2 14.5 0.04 1.2 0.6 0.05 
(0.64) (0.00) (0.84) (0.28) (0.43) (0.81) 
R 0.9 4.9 2.04 48.7 2.7 3.6 
(0.31) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.10) (0.06) 
m 3.4 7.2 4.08 106.6 2.4 0.08 
(0.06) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.11) (0.76) 
tx 0.5 0.5 0.2 4.07 9.8 0.9 
(0.45) (0.49) (0.61) (0.04) (0.002) (0.32) 
b 0.5 3.6 2.7 5.6 0.6 103.3 
(0.47) (0.06) (0.09) (0.02) (0.44) (0.0) 
* Values in parenthesis are p -values 
These results are conflicting with our assumptions. We assumed an exogenous y. 
However, according to Granger causality test results, real GDP is a function of real 
balances and itself. Also, the results indicate that government debt is only a function of 
itself and interest rate, not inflation rate as we assumed. Moreover, Granger causality 
indicates that real balances is a function of taxes and real outstanding government debt as 
well as y and R. 
Monetarist Theory 
The impulse responses of our model for the monetarist theory indicate that inflation 
rate is affected by the aggregate demand shock as well as monetary policy shocks. 
According to our impulse responses the disinflationary effect of a positive aggregate 
supply shock is confronted by increased tax revenue, money and bond demand71. Thus, 
71 Recall thai real balances are positively related with income and government bond is a function of real 
balances. Thus, higher income leads to higher money demand and therefore higher demand for government 
bonds. 
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inflation rate being totally determined by the independent monetary authority is not 
affected by the aggregate supply shock contemporaneously. 
Responses to Supply Shock 
Real GDP 
I 
Inflation Rate T.BUI Rate 
Real Balances Real Government Receipts Real Outstanding Government Debt 
-J 
Aggregate supply / demand analysis argues that given aggregate supply a positive 
aggregate demand shock increases inflation rate in the short run. Our impulse responses 
indicate this same relation. Interest rate (being determined by the monetary authority 
exogenously) and the real balances (being a function of income and interest rate only) are 
not affected by the demand shock contemporaneously. However, higher inflation rate 
decreases the real rate of interest and so the demand for government bonds. To overcome 
the resulting decrease in bond seignorage government increases taxes. 
Responses to Demand Shock 
Real GDP Inflation Rate 
Real Balances Real Government Receipts 
The impulse responses indicate that the fiscal policy variable does not have any 
contemporaneous effect on any of the variables. All variables react to this shock with one 
period lag. Aggregate supply, interest rate, real balances and government bonds decrease 
before going back to their steady state values. As opposed to their u -shaped impulse 
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response curves a positive fiscal policy shock creates oscillations in inflation rate. 
Moreover, the variance decomposition table indicates the low explanatory power of the 
fiscal policy variable on inflation rate. Fiscal policy explains only 0.2% (0.4%) of 
variation in inflation rate i 
Real GDP 
* \ 0 » * 
I V  
Real Balance! 
If" 
As the monetarist theory argues, our impulse responses indicate that the monetary 
authority controls the rate of inflation. An increase in interest rates increases inflation rate 
but decreases real balances, government bonds and t period real wealth wt.7: 
Responses to Monetary Policy Shock 
Inflation Rate 
Recall, that under monetarist theory tax revenue is determined by the fiscal authority 
to satisfy the solvency of the government budget constraint. Thus, tax revenue should be 
such that the real wealth is equal to the government revenue (mt+ b, + Tt). Our impulse 
responses indicate that the decrease in real wealth is less than the decrease in real 
balances and real debt. Therefore, taxes increase as a response to higher interest rate, to 
72 Period t real wealth is: vv =  —  =  m  {  —  + R  ,  — b  , .  
p, " n, " Ji, 
i the second (third) period. 
Responses to Fiscal Policy Shock 
Inflation Rate 
Real Government Receipts 
!W 
Real Outstanding Government Debt 
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satisfy the solvency of the government budget constraint. However, monetary policy is 
not as effective on inflation rate as the monetarist theory argues. Although R, m and b 
granger causes inflation rate, inflation rate explains 99.3% (91.4%) of variation in itself in 
the first (third) period. Monetary policy explains only 0.6% of variation in inflation rate in 
first period and 3.4% (4.2%) of variation in the second (third) period. 
Note that money supply, an endogenous variable of the model affect inflation rate 
only with a lag. Interest rate explains 1.6% (34.2%) of variation in m in the first (third) 
period and real balances explain 2.1% (2.3%) of variation in inflation rate in the third 
(fifth) period. 
Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic 
Contrary to the monetarist theory positive aggregate supply shock decreases 
(increases) inflation rate (interest rate) contemporaneously. The impulse responses of the 
monetarist theory indicated that inflation rate do not change in response to an 
aggregate supply shock. However, under the assumptions of the unpleasant monetarist 
arithmetic a positive aggregate supply shock does not create an equally effective demand 
movement. Thus, inflation rate decreases. Under the assumptions of the monetarist theory 
part of the increase in income was melted by increase in taxes. However, under an active 
fiscal policy taxes do not respond and a positive supply shock creates an increase in 
income out of taxes. Although, higher interest rate has a negative affect on real balances 
the impulse responses indicate that the effect of income on real balances is higher than the 
effect of interest rate. 
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l=i V 3/ 1 
Real Government Receipts 
\ Z Z  A  
- I V  
je,,. Real Outstanding Government Debt 
IV 
According to the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic, fiscal authority determines its 
policy variable independent of the monetary policy and although monetary authority 
determines the rate of inflation it is dependent on the fiscal authorities actions in order to 
satisfy the government budget constraint. Our impulse responses indicate that the fiscal 
policy variable is independent of all shocks except its own, contemporaneously. However, 
monetary policy variable reacts to shocks to satisfy the government budget constraint. In 
contrast to our results for the monetarist theory, interest rates increase as a response to a 
positive aggregate supply and a positive fiscal policy shock. 
Real GDP 
Real Balances 
Responses to Fiscal Policy Shock 
! ..T 
I 
Real Government Receipts 
T Bill Rate 
L 
The impulse responses of a fiscal policy shock indicate the positive relation 
between monetary and fiscal policy variables, as expected. A negative fiscal policy shock 
increases the government deficit (g, -tx,). Monetary authority being responsible for the 
solvency of the government budget constraint lowers interest rates to provide enough 
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money / bond seignorage (low interest rate increases money demand and so, increases 
money seignorage for the government). 
Unpleasant monetarist arithmetic argues that fiscal policy effects inflation rate only 
through its effect on monetary policy variable. According to the variance decomposition 
Responses to Monetary Policy Shock 
Real GDP 
IV-
Real Balances Real Government Receipts } Real Outstanding Government Debt 
— " — ;  -  • —  :  ^ .  .  
'N 1W-— !• 
tables, taxes explain 10.5% (9.3%). whereas interest rate explains only 0.3% (3.2%)of 
variation in inflation rate in the first (third) period (which is less than the explanatory 
power of aggregate supply. (Aggregate supply explains 3.6% (3.3%) of variation in 
inflation in the first (third) period). However, the fiscal policy variable taxes explain only 
1.9% (1.75%) of variation in interest rates in the first (fifth) period, which is less than the 
explanatory power of income and real balances. (Income explains 3.6% (6.9%) of 
variation in inflation in the first (fifth) period, whereas real balances explain zero percent 
(2.0%) of variation in inflation rate in the first (fifth) period.) 
Fiscal Theory of Price Level 
Fiscal theory of price level assumes that both the monetary and the fiscal authority 
act independently and the price level is determined by the fiscal authority as a solvency 
condition of the government budget constraint. According to the impulse responses both 
the fiscal and the monetary policy variables respond contemporaneously to their own 
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shocks. Inflation rate is affected by aggregate supply, demand and fiscal policy shocks 
contemporaneously. 
According to the impulse responses a positive aggregate supply shock decreases 
inflation rate and increases money and bond demand. Neither the fiscal policy variable (as 
was the case in monetarist theory results) nor the monetary policy variable (as the case in 
unpleasant monetarist theory results) reacts to this exogenous shock contemporaneously. 
Responses to Supply Shock 
Real GDP Inflation Rale 
Real Balances Real Government Receipts 
c:;: 
iz 
j Real Outstanding Government Debt 
lee' 
The impulse responses of inflation rate due to a positive monetary policy shock are 
very similar to the ones for monetarist theory and the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic. 
Responses to Monetary Policy Shock 
'™: A 
Real GDP 
§ \  
Real Balances 
IT " 1 
Inflation Rate "i r 
: "U 
T-Bill Rate 
Real Government Receipts Real Oytatandi 
According to the impulse responses of the monetarist theory a positive monetary 
policy shock increases taxes. However, the impulse responses of the unpleasant 
monetarist arithmetic and the fiscal theory of price level indicate no contemporaneous 
changes in the fiscal policy variable. Under the assumptions of the unpleasant monetarist 
theory higher inflation rate decreases real wealth and increased money and bond demand 
absorbs the effects of the monetary policy shock. In case of FTPL the monetary policy 
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variable does not affect inflation rate contemporaneously. Recall that, according to the 
assumptions of FTPL government bonds are net wealth. Thus, price level is determined 
by the fiscal policy through this wealth effect. Since, wealth is defined as, W,+, =Mt + 
RtBt, an increase in today's interest rate effects not today's but tomorrow's wealth and the 
price level.73 
The variance decomposition tables of the FTPL indicate that in the first period 
inflation rate is affected by itself, the fiscal policy variable and income. Similar to our 
results for the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic model, taxes explain 10.5% (9.1%) of 
variation in inflation rate in the first (third) period. Although the interest rates and the real 
balances have no explanatory power on the contemporaneous variation in inflation rate, 
the monetary policy variable explains 3.8% (3.9%) of variation in inflation rate in the 
third (fifth) period. Note that the explanatory power of monetary policy shocks on the 
variation of inflation rate is almost same on all three models. 
However, theory does not explain our results for the fiscal policy shock. FTPL argues 
that once the fiscal authority decreases taxes, households -believing that today's tax 
policy will not lead to higher taxes tomorrow, would like to consume more. Thus, 
inflation rate will increase. This negative relation between inflation rate and taxes is not 
seen in our impulse response graphs. Our results show that a positive fiscal shock 
increases inflation rate and decreases government debt. 
73 Real wealth is: vvr„ = = m, —— + R, —— 6,. 
Pi* I ^1»! Tf* i 
Therefore the household budget constraint is: ni t  +b t  +T t  = w, 
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Vector Error Correction Model Estimation Results 
Monetarist Theory 
The structural VECM identified by the assumptions of the monetarist theory, defines 
technology and monetary policy shocks. 
The point estimates of impulse responses of variables due to a positive monetary 
policy shock are compatible with the theory. An increase in interest rates increases 
inflation rate but decreases real balances and taxes. This positive relation between 
inflation rate and the interest rate is seen in all impulse responses. 
The impulse responses of variables in differences / levels indicate that a positive 
technology shock decreases inflation rate and interest rate, but increases output, taxes and 
government bonds. According to the monetarist theory interest rate, the monetary policy 
variable is determined independently by the monetary policy variable. Therefore, interest 
rates should not react to technology shocks contemporaneously. 
Moreover, the impulse responses of the levels / differences indicate that aggregate 
supply, interest rate and inflation rate increases due to a positive fiscal policy shock. This 
is the relation we would expect from a model defined under the assumptions of the 
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic not a monetarist theory. 
According to our variance decomposition tables, technology and monetary policy 
shocks explain 54% (57%) of variation in inflation rate in the first (fifth) period. 
However, most of this effect of permanent shocks on inflation rate is due to technology 
shocks. Contrary to the monetarist theory, monetary policy explains only % 0.01 (% 0.1) 
of variation in inflation rate in the first (fifth) period. The 53% and 12% of variation in 
inflation rate is explained by technology and fiscal policy shocks respectively. As for the 
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income, the variance decomposition table indicates that taxes explain 45% and interest 
rate explain 24% of variation in income. 
The variance decomposition table indicates a passive monetary policy. Inflation 
(technology) explains 53% (30%) variation in interest rate in the first period, fiscal 
policy shock which is supposed to be ineffective on monetary policy variable (according 
to the monetarist theory) explains 16% (32%) of variation in interest rate in the first 
(fifth) period. (In the fifth period monetary policy (technology) shocks explain 0.1% and 
technology shocks explain 36% of variation in interest rate). 
Fiscal Theory of Price Level 
According to the fiscal theory of price level lower taxes leads to higher inflation rate. 
People believing that lower taxes today will not lead to higher taxes tomorrow, realizes an 
increase in their income due to this fiscal policy and demand more goods. Hence, given 
aggregate supply an increase in demand increases inflation rate. Our impulse responses of 
variables due to a fiscal policy shock certify this negative relation between taxes and 
inflation rate. The impulse responses of levels / differences indicate that income, inflation 
and interest rate increase (real balances and government bonds decrease) due to a 
negative fiscal policy shock -higher taxes. 
Besides fiscal policy shock our FTPL model defined technology and monetary 
policy shocks. According to the impulse responses a positive technology shock leads to 
higher income and lower inflation and interest rate as expected. However, our results 
indicate a negative relationship between income and real balances and between income 
and taxes, which the model cannot explain. Similarly, for Ml used as monetary 
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aggregate, the impulse responses of the monetary policy shock indicate a positive 
relationship between interest rate and real balances74. 
According to the impulse responses, an increase in interest rates increases demand for 
money and government bonds and decreases inflation rate. The negative relation between 
the nominal interest rate and inflation rate is not what the fisher equation indicates. 
Besides these problematic relations driven by the impulse response analysis, the 
variance decomposition tables contradict the arguments of FTPL too. Taxes explain 38%; 
income explains 19% whereas interest rate explains 1.2% of variation in inflation rate for 
the first period. For the independency of the monetary and fiscal policy variables, the 
variance decomposition table indicates that the monetary policy variable explain 3.9% 
and inflation rate explain 51% of variation in the fiscal policy variable. To sum, 
permanent shocks explain 24% of whereas, transitory shocks explain 75% of variation in 
taxes. Moreover. 24%. 26% and 1% of variation in interest rate is explained by income, 
interest rate and taxes respectively. The low explanatory power of taxes (interest rate) on 
monetary (fiscal) policy variable is what we expect. However, the significant power of 
government debt on interest rate is not what the theory predicts. According to the 
variance decomposition tables, government debt explains 40% of variation in interest 
rate. 
74 When M2 is used as monetary aggregate, the estimation results for the relation between m, y and R 
indicate a positive relation between real balances and interest rate and between real balances and income, 
m, =-2.78 + 0.84% +0.003R, 
(0.08) (0.01) (0.001) 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
In that study, we analysed U S inflation rate using structural vector autoregression 
and structural vector error correction models under the assumptions of monetarist theory, 
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic and the fiscal theory of price level. Our aim was to 
distinguish the effects of monetary and fiscal policies on price level determination. We 
assumed taxes the fiscal policy variable and -in order to make all theories compatible 
with each other- interest rate is the monetary policy variable. 
First, we worked with a structural vector autoregression model. Our results indicate 
the importance of monetary policy variables on price level determination. However, our 
variance decomposition tables and impulse responses provided evidence on fiscal policy 
effecting inflation rate through the monetary policy variable. 
Since, previous studies provided evidence on cointegration relations between interest 
rate and inflation rate; money supply, interest rate and income, we proceeded with a 
structural vector error correction model. However, neither SVAR nor SVECM results 
provided any evidence of FTPL 
Our results are based on the assumption that the monetary authority sets interest rate 
rather than money supply. Although, in today's world this is a realistic assumption, to be 
compatible with theoretical studies, a further study would be to test if our results hold for 
money supply targeting policies. 
In Chapter Two we have listed some studies on the effect of fiscal policy on inflation 
rate. As oppose to these studies -each one based on different theoretical assumptions, in 
that study, we covered all the theories on price level determination. Moreover, based on 
the FTPL argument that the government may choose inflation tax even with low 
dependence on money seignorage, we did our analyses for U S inflation rate. Hence 
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another further study would be to analyse the inflation rate of country with high 
government debt. 
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APPENDIX A. MATHEMATICAL SOLUTIONS FOR THE PRICE LEVEL 
DETERMINATION 
Appendix A solves the model given in Chapter Two for the cases of 
1. Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic: Ricardian policy; active fiscal and passive 
monetary policy 
2. Fiscal Theory of Price Level: Non Ricardian policy; active fiscal and active 
monetary policy 
and analyses the long run effect of a fiscal shock on price level in each of these cases. 
In the case of an active fiscal policy the fiscal authority will set his policy variables 
{gt}. {tXi} and {b,} independent of the solvency of the government budget constraint. I 
will assume that they are set as constants. Assuming a constant output level, it follows 
that the consumption level must also be constant. So, the first order conditions of the 
household optimisation problem imply: 
where c is the constant consumption level. 
Note that under the aggregate resource constraint, equation (9), the household and 
government budget constraints are represented by the same equation: 
(5) 
(6) 
Pt(gi—tXi) — M, —M[.| +B, — (Rt-i) Bt-i 
Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic 
Ricardian policy: active fiscal and passive monetary policy 
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Under a Ricardian environment, an active fiscal policy leaves the monetary authority 
with the burden of the solvency of the government budget constraint. Hence, the 
monetary policy is driven by the fiscal policy variables. 
For a constant level of primary surpluses, D = (g -txt) and constant real valued 
government debt, b, the government's flow budget constraint is75: 
D = m, -m,_ f P,-i ' 
Pi / 
+ b — R; ' P,-\ ^ 
< Pt 
(8) 
Given fiscal policy and the demand conditions -equation (5) and (6)- equation (8) 
becomes a function of R, D and b. 
D=c R. 





z , w 
vM-, j j 
(14) 
Equation (14) is solved for the path of the monetary policy variable, the interest rate, 
as a function of D and b: 
R,= 1 + - R,.i -1 
r  D  b r  






Then the rate of inflation, nt = follows from (5) and (15): 
Pt-1 
x ,=P+- M-2-1) 
( n  h (  i )  N  
(*,.,-1) —- 1-- -l 




Suppose, <t> = ————^L_£ and ^ . Thus, R, =1+ ——-— 
c P (R,.\ -!)<!>+a 
The steady state interest rates must, from (15), solve: 
( R Q — +  c t ) ( R  —  1 )  =  ( / ?  —  ! )  
75 Under the aggregate resource constraint: y, = c, + g, the household and government budget constraints are 
same. 
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There are two steady state values of interest rate: 
1 + </>-a /?, = 1 and R2 = • 
0 
To check for the stability of the steady state, ^—— —> 0 
dR. 
dR i - i  «=/?, 
= — = /?< 1 and 1 
a dR 
•i-i R=R, 




Hence. /?, = 1 is a stable and Rz is an unstable equilibrium. 
Our simulation results for unpleasant monetarist arithmetic shows that for /? = 0.97, 
interest rate, inflation rate and real balances evolve as: 

















Note that, according to monetarist theory, inflation rate determined by the monetary 







Fiscal Theory of the Price Level 
Non Ricardian policy: active fiscal and active monetary policy 
As opposed to unpleasant monetarist argument the fiscal theory of the price level 
argues that the price level is determined by the fiscal policy, even if the monetary 
authority follows an active policy. 
In a non Ricardian environment, an active fiscal policy requires that the households 
will hold government bonds. However, if households know that the government will roll 
over its debt without ever retiring it, they will not demand any bonds. The condition to 
prevent zero demand is for the households to know that the government will finance its 
future debt with future surplus. Therefore, in order to prevent ponzi games the 
transversality condition has to hold. Therefore, the FTPL works with the intertemporal 
government budget constraint. 
The central bank sets the rate of interest such that: 
The money supply is: 
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E l  
P, 
f \ 
Pi+ l  
P , *X~PP< 
Recall that the government budget constraint together with the transversality 





\  Pi-i  
=£f ï î '  
j-0 <=i Pt \  —î* ]  P t+ j  
(19) 
Let Q = -^ 
Pt 
M 
P<- J r.  p< i r , p, 
and 
*=z n ,zc' i p.., 
/  = !  V >='  R< Ps R/* i  P i * j  
i*I 
. Thus, equation (19) is: Q = f + 1F 
Given the fiscal policy D, = Dt+i = D and equations (5') and (6'); 
£2 = —C-^ -— + ~^ . T = c-D and T = V/?'(c-D )  
P.-PP,-1 P M 
Thus equation (19) reduces to: 
j^rrc-°+P'ic'D) 
(20) 
The price level evolves according to: 
P, = P,-i 
j=Q 
Y^P ' (c -D) -~-C 
j=0 P 
(21) 
and the rate of inflation is: 
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n. = 
-b + ic-Dj^P1*1 
~^~c + <<c~D ) ÏLPj  
P J=0 ) 
(22) 





-"^-c + (c-D)^/?y 
p 1=0 J 
Our simulation results for P = 0.97. R = 0.7 also indicate the negative relation 







APPENDIX B. EXAMPLES OF VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION MODEL 
IDENTIFICATION RESTRICTIONS 
Assume the researcher defines a dynamic system of equations for the variables, {kt}, 
{w,} and {q,} as a first order vector autoregression process. The structural form of the 
system is: 
kt = -B12 wt - Bi3qt +Dn(l) k,.| +Dt:(l) wt.| + Di3(l)qt.|+ £k,t 
w, = -B;i k, - Bzjq, +D2i(l) k,., +D;:( 1 ) w,„i + Dz;(l)q,.,+ ew.t 
qt = -B31 kt - Bîiw, +D3i(l) kt-i +D32(l) wvl + 033(1 )qt.i+ Eqit 
where these series satisfies all the properties given in Chapter Five. 
The matrix form is: 
1 - - 1 M: N3 V *Ai d x z  ^13 . 
:i 1 ^23 u?, = d 2 l  d 2 2  d 2 3  1vM + 




For estimation purposes the researcher should use the VAR in standard form; 
«11 «a «13 ft, 
= a22 «23 w,-l + e», 
1 ja «32 » .« i - l .  /./' 
and for innovation accounting he/she will need the system in VMA form; 
V C U (L )  C r _(L)  C13(L) X" 
w
, 
= C 2 i (L )  C 2 2 (L )  C 2 3 (L )  £2, 
-1 . .  C31(Z.) C r _(L)  C33(L) f x .  
The researcher may use different methods to impose the restrictions to identify the 
structural VAR. 
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Sims Methodology: The researcher may apply the Choleski decomposition and 
restrict the upper triangle of the B matrix for the given ordering of the variables; kt, wt, qt. 
Thus, the restrictions: z,: = 0, z13 =0 and z23 =0, define the model as: 
• 1 0 0" K «.2 «13 " Xi " 









Sims-Bernanke Methodology: It is possible that the economic theory already 
suggests specific relations among variables. Suppose the theory suggests that kt has no 
contemporaneous effect on wt and qt. Moreover, q, has no contemporaneous effect on k,. 









0  1 
-23 W, 
= 
«2. «22 «23 W,-t + 
0 C32 1 /A. .fl3, «32 fl33„ /A-i „ 
Blanchard-Quah Decomposition: If the theory imposes restrictions on the long 
run and short run behaviour of the variables, Blanchard-Quah decomposition uses these 
restrictions to differentiate the temporary and permanent effects of various shocks on 
variables. Lets assume that researcher works on a bivariate system of k, and wt, which are 
effected by the shocks E| and £?. It is also true that kt is not stationary but the first 
difference of kt, Akt, and w, is.76 Suppose the theory predicts that £2 does not have a long 
76 In their paper Blanchard-Quah works with the real GNP and the unemployment rate. They argue that it is 
possible to differentiate the temporary and permanent components of the real GNP using the theoretical 
argument that the aggregate demand shocks have no long run effect on the long run aggregate supply. 
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run effect on Akt sequence. Therefore, the following system is identified by the 
restriction, £cu: = 0: 
X" c, (L )  
c :  (L )  
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APPENDIX C. STRUCTURAL VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION MODEL RESULTS 
MONETARIST THEORY 
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Real GDP 
Responses to Money Demand Shock 
Inflation Rate T-Bill Rate 
!"M 
Real Balances Real Government Receipts Real Outstanding Government Debt I 
Real GDP 
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UNPLEASANT MONETARIST ARITHMETIC 
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FISCAL THEORY OF PRICE LEVEL 
Responses to Supply Shock 
Inflation Rale T-Bill Rate 
::: 
Real Balances Real Government Receipts 
Responses to Demand Shock 
Inflation Rate 
: ^ Real Outstanding Government Debt 
Real Balx'ices Real Government Receipts 
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97 
Responses to Money Demand Shock 
Real GDP Inflation Rate 
Real Balances Real Government Receipts Real Outstanding Government Debt 
Responses to Fiscal Policy Shock 
T-Bill Rate 
Real Balances Real Government Receipts RmI nuMtandnigffivemment Debt 
Responses to Bond Demand Shock 
Real GDP 
Real Balances Real Government Receipts Real Outstanding Government Debt 
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MONETARIST THEORY 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to aggregate supply shock 
Horizon y 71 R m tx b 
I 100 0 0 4.1 26.6 0.01 
3 98.1 0.3 2.5 3.6 26.8 0.08 
5 94.1 0.3 2.6 3.1 26.4 0.08 
7 93.9 0.3 2.6 3.1 26.3 0.08 
10 93.9 0.3 2.6 3.1 26.3 0.08 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to demand shock 
Horizon y 71 R m tx b 
1 0 99.3 0 0 6.4 8.6 
3 0.03 91.4 0.07 0.1 5.7 8.01 
5 0.07 91.0 0.08 0.5 5.6 7.9 
7 0.08 91 0.08 0.6 5.6 7.9 
10 0.08 91 0.08 0.6 5.6 7.9 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to monetary policy shock 
Horizon Y 7t R m tx b 
/ 0 0.7 100 1.6 1.1 4.5 
3 0.3 4.2 1.7 34.2 2.0 11.2 
5 2.0 4.3 2.01 36.4 2.9 12.3 
7 2.1 4.3 2.01 36.3 2.9 12.4 
10 2.1 4.3 2.01 36.3 2.9 12.4 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to money demand shock 
Horizon y 71 R m tx b 
1 0 0 0 94.3 0.6 0.29 
3 1.9 2.1 1.67 57.3 1.7 0.31 
5 2.3 2.3 2.01 50.5 1.9 0.28 
7 2.3 2.3 2.01 50.2 1.9 0.28 
10 2.3 2.3 2.01 50.2 1.9 0.28 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to fiscal policy shock 
Horizon y 71 R m tx b 
I 0 0 0 0 63.3 0 
3 0.3 0.4 0.15 1.1 61.2 0.35 
5 0.4 0.5 0.15 0.9 60.2 0.35 
7 0.4 0.5 0.15 1.0 60.1 0.35 
10 0.4 0.5 0.15 1.0 60.1 0.35 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to bond demand shock 
Horizon y 71 R m tx b 
I 0 0 0 0 1.9 86.5 
3 0.4 1.4 1.1 3.6 2.4 80 
5 1.1 1.5 1.17 8.4 2.8 79 
7 1.2 1.5 1.18 8.8 2.8 79 
10 1.3 1.5 1.18 8.8 2.9 79 
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UNPLEASANT MONETARIST ARITHMETIC 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to aggregate supply shock 
Horizon y 7t R m tx b 
1 100 3.6 3.6 3.2 0 1.62 
3 96.5 3.3 6.9 2.8 10.2 1.8 
5 93.9 3.3 6.8 2.43 10.12 1.69 
7 93.8 3.3 6.8 2.41 10.11 1.69 
10 93.8 3.3 6.8 2.41 10.11 1.69 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to demand shock 
Horizon y n R m tx b 
1 0 85.5 0 0 0 5.2 
3 0.05 80.9 0.08 0.12 0.23 4.4 
5 0.06 80.6 0.09 0.28 0.24 4.3 
7 0.07 80.6 0.09 0.3 0.25 4.3 
10 0.07 80.6 0.09 0.3 0.25 4.3 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to monetary policy shock 
Horizon y 71 R m tx b 
1 0 0.3 94.4 1.4 0 3.08 
3 0.7 3.2 88.2 29.9 1.4 8.2 
5 1.7 3.4 87.8 31.7 2.09 9.11 
7 1.8 3.4 87.8 31.6 2.10 9.12 
10 1.8 3.4 87.8 31.6 2.11 9.12 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to money demand shock 
Horizon y n R m tx b 
1 0 0 0 95.3 0 0.46 
3 1.9 1.9 1.07 58.7 1.28 0.53 
5 2.3 2.08 2.09 51.7 1.56 0.48 
7 2.4 2.08 2.09 51.4 1.55 0.48 
10 2.4 2.08 2.09 51.3 1.55 0.48 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to fiscal policy shock 
Horizon y 71 R m tx b 
I 0 10.5 1.9 0.03 100 8.8 
3 0.5 9.3 1.7 5.8 86.6 11.9 
5 0.83 9.29 1.8 6.1 85.4 12.1 
7 0.84 9.29 1.8 6.23 85.3 12.1 
10 0.85 9.29 1.8 6.24 85.3 12.1 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to bond demand shock 
Horizon y 71 R m tx b 
1 0 0 0 0 0 80.6 
3 0.3 1.21 1.2 3.09 0.2 72.9 
5 0.9 1.24 1.30 7.6 0.5 72.2 
7 1.02 1.24 1.31 7.96 0.62 72.1 
10 1.03 1.24 1.31 7.99 0.63 72.1 
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FISCAL THEORY OF PRICE LEVEL 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to aggregate supply shock 
Horizon y 71 R m tx b 
I 100 3.6 0 4.1 0 2.5 
3 96.3 3.4 2.8 6.1 9.0 3.5 
5 93.9 3.4 2.8 5.5 9.1 3.3 
7 93.8 3.4 2.8 5.4 9.09 3.3 
10 93.7 3.4 2.8 5.4 9.09 3.3 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to demand shock 
Horizon y 71 R m tx b 
1 0 85.8 0 0 0 5.3 
3 0.05 80.4 0.08 0.1 0.2 4.4 
5 0.07 80.2 0.09 0.2 0.25 4.3 
7 0.075 80.1 0.09 0.3 0.25 4.3 
10 0.075 80.1 0.09 0.3 0.25 4.3 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to monetary policy shock 
Horizon y 71 R m tx b 
1 0 0 100 94.3 0 2.8 
3 0.7 3.8 94 56.8 1.4 8.3 
5 1.9 3.98 93.6 33.6 2.2 9.2 
7 1.9 3.99 93.6 33.5 2.2 9.2 
10 1.9 3.99 93.6 33.4 2.2 9.2 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to money demand shock 
Horizon y 71 R m tx b 
1 0 0 0 94.3 0 0.4 
3 1.9 1.9 1.7 56.8 1.2 0.5 
5 2.4 2.06 2.05 50.3 1.5 0.4 
7 2.4 2.06 2.05 50.08 1.5 0.4 
10 2.4 2.06 2.05 50.05 1.5 0.4 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to fiscal policy shock 
Horizon y 7t R m tx b 
1 0 10.5 0 0 100 7.5 
3 0.5 9.1 0.05 2.2 87.6 9.5 
5 0.73 9.1 0.05 2.8 86.3 9.6 
7 0.74 9.1 0.05 2.8 86.2 9.6 
10 0.74 9.1 005 2.8 86.2 9.6 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to bond demand shock 
Horizon y 71 R m tx b 
I 0 0 0 0 0 81.1 
3 0.3 1.2 1.2 2.9 0.2 73.5 
5 0.9 1.2 1.28 7.3 0.5 72.8 
7 1.01 1.2 1.29 7.7 0.6 72.8 
10 1.03 1.2 1.29 7.7 0.6 72.8 
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APPENDIX D. STRUCTURAL VECTOR ERROR CORRECTION MODEL RESULTS 
MONETARIST THEORY 
• Impulse responses of variables in levels to technology shock 
/ 
• Impulse responses of variables in levels to monetary policy shock 
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• Impulse responses of variables in differences to technology shock 
• Impulse responses of variables in differences to monetary policy shock 
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• Impulse responses of variables in levels to fiscal policy shock 
mujun 
• Impulse responses of variables in differences to fiscal policy shock 
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FISCAL THEORY OF PRICE LEVEL 
• Impulse responses of variables in levels to technology shock 
• Impulse responses of variables in levels to monetary policy shock 
105 
• Impulse responses of variables in levels to fiscal policy shock 
• Impulse responses of variables in differences to technology shock 
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• Impulse responses of variables in differences to monetary policy shock 
• Impulse responses of variables in differences to fiscal policy shock 
L 











Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to technology shock 
Horizon y Jt R m tx b 
I 1.4 53.7 30.0 0.0 3.9 6.7 
3 3.6 55.8 34.7 14.5 4.9 25.4 
5 13.1 57.7 38.2 26.4 11.6 35.1 
7 25.5 58.9 40.7 36.0 20.8 42.2 
10 41.1 60.1 43.1 46.2 35.7 49.7 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to monetary policy shock 
Horizon y 71 R m tx b 
I 24.0 0.0 0.1 35.4 7.6 0.0 
3 25.7 0.0 0.1 23.1 6.3 0.1 
5 28.9 0.0 0.2 17.2 5.7 0.3 
7 30.1 0.1 0.3 13.0 5.0 0.5 
10 29.0 0.1 0.5 8.9 4.1 0.9 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to joint effect of permanent shocks 
Horizon y 71 R m tx b 
1 25.4 53.7 30.0 35.4 11.6 6.7 
3 29.3 55.8 34.7 37.7 11.3 25.5 
5 42.1 57.7 38.4 43.6 17.2 35.4 
7 55.5 58.9 41.0 49.0 25.9 42.7 
10 70.1 60.2 43.6 55.1 39.8 50.6 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to joint effect of temporary shocks 
Horizon y 71 R m tx b 
1 74.6 46.3 70.0 64.6 88.4 93.3 
3 70.7 44.2 65.3 62.3 88.7 74.5 
5 57.9 42.3 61.6 56.4 82.8 64.6 
7 44.5 41.1 59.0 51.0 74.1 57.3 
10 29.9 39.8 56.4 44.9 60.2 49.4 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to fiscal policy shock 
Horizon y 71 R m tx b 
I 45.3 12.2 16.6 0.0 86.6 0.0 
3 0.1 3.5 0.4 12.9 1.9 73.3 
5 34.4 17.5 32.4 4.6 80.9 0.8 
7 24.1 18.6 33.9 7.6 72.4 1.0 
10 14.1 19.7 34.7 11.1 58.7 1.0 
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Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to technology shock 
Horizon y rt R m tx b 
1 19.6 19.7 23.9 17.7 0.0 0.2 
3 24.9 24.2 24.6 5.3 0.2 2.9 
5 40.3 24.3 25.9 3.8 2.2 3.0 
7 54.8 23.7 26.2 4.4 6.5 2.6 
10 68.6 22.7 25.5 6.1 14.7 2.1 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to monetary policy shock 
Horizon y 7t R m tx b 
1 17.1 1.2 26.3 0.1 3.9 48.2 
3 17.6 0.8 25.4 2.6 6.0 36.5 
5 12.7 0.6 23.1 3.1 4.8 37.1 
7 8.5 0.5 20.7 2.8 3.6 39.2 
10 4.8 0.4 17.9 2.3 2.5 42.2 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to fiscal policy shock 
Horizon y 71 R m tx b 
I 0.3 38.4 1.0 17.3 20.2 7.8 
3 0.2 36.5 1.9 23.8 21.4 14.1 
5 0.1 36.6 4.6 28.2 24.2 17.6 
7 0.3 37.1 7.9 31.7 29.2 20.0 
10 1.1 37.8 12.3 35.1 34.6 21.8 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to joint effect of permanent shocks 
Horizon y 7t R m tx b 
1 37.0 59.3 51.2 35.0 24.1 56.1 
3 42.6 61.5 51.9 31.7 27.6 53.4 
5 53.1 61.5 53.6 35.0 32.2 57.7 
7 63.5 61.3 54.8 38.9 29.3 61.8 
10 74.5 60.9 55.7 43.6 51.8 66.1 
Fraction of the forecast -error variance attributed to joint effect of temporary shocks 
Horizon y 7t R m tx b 
I 63.0 40.7 48.8 65.0 75.9 43.9 
3 57.4 38.5 48.1 68.3 72.4 46.6 
5 46.9 38.5 46.4 65.0 67.8 42.3 
7 36.5 38.7 45.2 61.1 60.7 38.2 
10 25.5 39.1 44.3 56.4 48.2 33.9 
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